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The Individual Mandate 
And the Taxing Power 
By Erik M. Jensen 
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This report has a limited purpose: to consider the 
constitutionality of one part of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA)-
the requirement that after 2013 most individuals 
either obtain a minimum level of health insurance 
(minimum essential coverage) or pay a penalty.l 
Even with the topic narrowed to that one subject, 
however, the report does not pretend to discuss 
everything. It does not systematically consider the 
validity of the so-called individual mandate 1.mder 
the commerce clause/ about which the author, a tax 
lawyer, is largely clueless. If the commerce clause 
provides authority by itself for all aspects of the 
mandate, you need read no further.3 This report 
matters not at all.4 
But the Obama administration and other sup-
porters of the individual mandate have been tout-
ing an alternative constitutional justification, one on 
which Congress clearly did not rely: That the charge 
on those who do not acquire suitable insurance will 
be a tax authorized by the taxing clause, which 
gives Congress the "Power To lay and Collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises,''5 and that the indi-
vidual mandate as a whole will be a valid exercise 
1 See the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(PPACA), section 1501, P.L. 111-148. A few of the details of the 
PPACA were changed by subsequent corrective legislation, with 
those changes effective as if included in the PPACA as originally 
passed. See Act of April 26, 2010, P.L. 111-159; Act of May 27, 
2010, P.L. 111-173. For purposes of this report, I will treat this 
post-act tweaking as part of the original legislation, without 
separate citation to the later enacbnents. 
2U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the 
"Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes"). 
3Consult your own adviser on the commerce clause. 
4There are so many issues. See Kathleen S. Swendiman, 
"Health Care: Constitutional Rights and Legislative Powers," 
Congressional Research Service (May 18, 2010), Doc 2010-11158, 
2010 TNT 97-14; Jennifer Staman et al., "Requiring Inclividuals 
to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis," CRS 
(May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Staman I]; Jennifer Staman et al., 
"Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Consti-
tutional Analysis," CRS (Oct. 15, 2010), Doc 2010-22610, 2010 
TNT 201-23; Staman et a!., "Requiring Inclividuals to Obtain 
Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis," CRS (Nov. 15, 
2011), Doc 2011-24032, 2011 TNT 221-44. And so little time. 
5U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1. All the legislative findings 
in the PPACA have to do with the commerce power. See PPACA 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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of the taxing power.6 To the extent that the com-
merce clause cannot do the heavy lifting, it is 
argued, the taxing clause can. 
The penalty-as-tax argument has not been made 
merely for show. In litigation brought by state 
attorneys general challenging the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate, the federal government 
has defended the penalty as a tax.7 For example, in 
seeking dismissal of the case arising in Virginia, the 
lawyers for Health and Human Services Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius invoked the Anti-Injtmction Act, 
which provides that "no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax 
shall be maintained in any court by any person" to 
challenge the jurisdiction of a federal court to hear 
the suit.8 And several prominent constitutional law-
section 1501(a)(1) ("The individual responsibility require-
ment ... is commercial and economic in nature, and substan-
tially affects interstate commerce"); section 1501(a)(2) (listing 
many economic effects, none related to taxation). In its findings, 
Congress cited only one Supreme Court decision, United States v. 
South-Eastem Undenuriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), for the 
proposition that "insurance is interstate commerce subject to 
Federal regulation." PPACA section 1501(a)(3). It cited no au-
thority construing the taxing clause. 
6See Robert Pear, "Changing Stance, Administration Now 
Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax," The New York Times, July 
18, 2010, at A-14 ("Administration officials say the tax argument 
is a linchpin of their legal case in defense of the health care 
overhaul and its individual mandate"). The president had 
earlier refused to characterize the penalty as a tax, apparently 
reluctant to support what might have been seen as a tax increase 
that could reach lower-income persons. [d.; see also George 
Stephanopoulos, "Obama: Mandate Is Not a Tax," ABC News, 
Sept. 20, 2009, available at http:/ /blogs.abcnews.com/ george/ 
2009/09 I obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax.htrnl. 
7See, e.g., Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp.2d 598 (E.D. Va. 
2010), Doc 2010-17270, 2010 TNT 149-11 (memorandum opinion 
denying the government's motion to dismiss, concluding that 
significant issues exist under all the government's theories); 
Virginia ex ref. Cuccine//i v. Sebe/ius, 728 F. Supp.2d 768 (E. D. Va. 
2010), Doc 2010-26522, 2010 TNT 239-8 (granting summary 
judgment to Virginia and rejecting the taxing clause as authority 
for the individual mandate), vacated, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. 2011), 
Doc 2011-19032, 2011 TNT 175-13 (concluding that Virginia did 
not have standing to challenge the individual mandate). 
8Section 742l(a) (emphasis added). The government did not 
argue that the penalty had to be a tax for the Anti-Injunction Act 
to be relevant; it argued that the act could be extended to reach 
taxlike penalties as well. The Anti-Injunction Act argument was 
successful in Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. 2011), 
Doc 2011-19031,2011 TNT 175-12, with one member of the panel 
dissenting. The argument was rejected in Thomas More Law Ctr. 
v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539-540 (6th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-14236, 
2011 TNT 126-9 (concluding that the penalty is not a tax for 
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act). In granting the petition for 
certiorari in Dep't of HHS v. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), 
in which the question presented is "whether Congress had the 
power under Article I of the Constitution to enact the minimum 
coverage provision," the Supreme Court also directed the 
parties to brief and argue Anti-Injuction Act issues. Should the 
Court reach the constitutionality of the individual mandate and 
find authority wanting, it will also need to address whether the 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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yers, Profs. Jack M. Balkin, Gillian E. Metzger, and 
Trevor W. Morrison, filed an amicus brief in several 
cases, including the Virginia dispute, arguing that 
the individual mandate was authorized by the 
taxing clause.9 
Some earlier versions of the healthcare legislation 
referred to the charge on the mlinsured or tmderin-
sured as an excise,1° a form of tax specifically 
mentioned in the taxing clause, or as a 2.5 percent 
"tax" on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI).11 
But as enacted, the PPACA did not use the language 
of taxation. The charge was simply called a "pen-
alty."12 Yes, the provision was added to the code, 
payment of any penalty will be made with a tax-
payer's annual income tax rehtrn, and enforcement 
will lie with the IRS. But the code contains all sorts 
of provisions for payment of interest and penalties 
that are not taxes,13 and the fact that the IRS has the 
obligation to collect interest and penalties does not 
magically convert those charges into taxes. H 
To be sure, a charge need not be labeled as a "tax, 
duty, impost, or excise" to be within the congres-
sional taxi_ng power,15 but this report argues that the 
mandate can be severed from the rest of the PPACA, a question 
raised by appeals coming out of the same litigation, Nat'/ Fed'n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius and Florida v. Dep't of HHS, Doc 
2010-22392, 2010 TNT 199-7. 
9See Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional Law Professors in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-
00188-HEH (E.D. Va. 2010) [hereinafter Con Law Brief]. The 
brief focused on the taxing clause, including the possibility that 
the penalty might be a direct tax, see infra Part III.B., but the 
authors made it clear that they were advancing alternative 
arguments that would be necessary only if the commerce clause 
were found wanting. 
10See S. 1796, America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, section 
1301, lllth Cong., 1st Sess. (including "excise tax on individuals 
without essential health benefits coverage"). 
11 See H.R. 3962, Affordable Health Care for America Act, 
section 501(a), 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (including "tax" on "indi-
viduals without acceptable health care coverage"). The charge 
was referred to as a tax 14 times in the bill. See Steven J. Willis 
a_nd Nakku Chung, "Constitutional Decapitation and Health-
care," Tax Notes, July 12, 2010, p. 169, Doc 2010-11669, or 2010 
TNT 133-6; see also Charles S. Clark, "Healthcare Reform Tax 
Constitutionality a Hot Topic," Tax Notes, Nov. 16, 2009, p. 734, 
Doc 2009-24982, or 2009 TNT 217-1 (discussing constitutionality 
of what was then called an excise or surtax). 
12Section SOOOA(b)(l) and (c). 
13See generally sections 6601-6665. 
14Cf section 6096 (providing for collection by the IRS of 
amounts designated by taxpayers (up to $3) for the presidential 
election campaign fund, amounts having nothing to do with 
additional tax liability). 
15 A valid tax is a valid tax, call it what you will. Penn Mut. 
Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960); id. ("It 
is not necessary to uphold the validity of [a] tax ... that the tax 
itself bear an accurate label"). I shall argue, however, that labels 
affect how we think about a charge and the deference that 
should be accorded a congressional enactment. See infra Part 
II. A. 
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attempt to find constitutional authority for the 
individual mandate in the taxing clause is mis-
guided. The cans of worms opened by invoking the 
taxing power are full of really slimy, squiggly 
creatures. Relying on the taxing clause raises skep-
ticism, adds little or nothing to the substantive 
arguments for constitutionality, and complicates 
matters in an important way. 
Raising skepticism: The argument under the taxing 
clause is being advanced because of nervousness 
about whether the commerce clause provides suffi-
cient authority for the individual mandate. The 
argument smacks of desperation. I( despite the 
extraordinary expansion in the scope of the com-
merce clause in 20th-century jurisprudence, propo-
nents of the mandate are still nervous about 
constitutional questions, we should all be nervous. 
Adding little, if any, substantive support: It is hard 
to see the taxing clause as helping to justify the 
generally applicable requirement that each indi-
vidual secure health insurance. If the individual 
mandate works perfectly, everyone will be incen-
tivized16 to acquire insurance, no penalties will be 
paid, and government revenues will not be directly 
increased at all. In the Virginia litigation, the federal 
government argued that the measure will be 
"revenue-raising[, and] the associated regulatory 
provisions bear a reasonable relation to the statute's 
taxing purpose."17 But that description gets things 
backwards. The statute has no "taxing purpose." 
The penalty will support the regulatory structure-
it has no independent reason for existence - not 
vice-versa. 
Complicating the argument for constitutionality: At 
best, the taxing clause might validate the penalty 
provision of the mandate - the amount that might 
have to be paid directly to Uncle Sam.l8 But this line 
of argument creates other difficulties. The taxing 
clause is not, as many seem to think, a simple 
alternative to the commerce clause. If the charge 
will really be a tax, it will be subject to the limita-
tions in the Constitution on the taxing power, 
regardless of whether the charge might otherwise 
be a valid regulation of commerce. One particular 
limitation, the apportionment rule applicable to 
direct taxes that are not "taxes on incomes/' pre-
sents a non-triviat constitutional problem - but 
16I apologize for using the word "incentivized." I want to 
smmd wonkish. 
17Vir:.,>inin v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp.2d at 612. 
18lf the requirement to acquire insurance is valid to begin 
with under the commerce clause or whatever, a reasonable 
penalty would be valid without recourse to any other constitu-
tional provision. 
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only if the penalty will be a tax.19 And some 
commentators have posited another constitutional 
issue that may be implicated if the penalty will be a 
tax: the uniformity rule that applies to indirect 
taxes.20 
My argument is simple. The charge will be what 
Congress called it - a penalty21 - and, for propo-
nents of the mandate, nothing is gained by arguing 
otherwise.22 If the penalty will not be a tax (or, more 
broadly, a tax, duty, impost, or excise)/3 the taxing 
clause provides no independent authority for its 
imposition- and, a fortiori, for imposition of the 
individual mandate. That should get us back to 
analyzing commerce clause issues, which is where 
the debate should have been centered all along -it 
was that clause that Congress relied on as author-
ity24- and about which I express no well-founded 
opinion. (As of this writing, no court has concluded 
that the taxing clause provides authority for the 
individual mandate.25) But if the penalty will be a 
19See U.S. Const. Art. I, section 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and 
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers"); U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4 ("No 
Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Propor-
tion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken"); U.S. Const. Amend. XVI (exempting "taxes on in-
comes" from the apportionment requirement). 
20See U.S. Canst. Art. I, section 8, d. 1 ("all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States"); 
Memorandum of the Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, and Prof. Randy E. Barnett as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 
19-20, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH [hereinafter 
Cato Brief] (arguing that if the penalty is an excise, it violates the 
uniformity clause because of geographical variation). But see 
infra text accompanying notes 133-136 (arguing that unifonnity 
will not be a problem with the individual mandate penalty). 
21 Jack M. Balkin has called the penalty a "penalty tax," as if 
that term helped with constitutional issues. See "The Constitu-
tionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance," 362 
New Eng.]. Med. 482 (2010). 
22The Joint Committee on Taxation's report on the legislation 
complicated matters by referring to the penalty as an "excise tax 
on individuals without essential health benefits coverage," JCT, 
"Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the 'Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010,' as Amended, in Combination with the 
'Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,"' JCX-18-10, at 35 
(Mar. 21, 2010), Doc 2010-6147, 2010 TNT 55-23. This character-
ization was presumably left over from the JCT's reports on 
earlier versions of the legislation, which used the term "excise" 
to describe the penalty. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
23From now on I shall generally use the term "tax" as an 
umbrella term to refer to the four listed items in the taxing 
clause. I have argued elsewhere that the category "Duties, 
Imposts and Excises" constitutes a subset of "Taxes"- indirect 
taxes. See Erik M. Jensen, "The Apportionment of 'Direct Taxes': 
Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?" 97 Colum. L Rev. 2334, 
2393-2397 (1997); see also infra Part liLA. 
24 See PPACA section 1501(a)(1); supra note 5. 
:c.sThat includes cases in which a court has concluded that the 
individual mandate is constitutional. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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tax, things get hairy: We must consider whether the 
penalty will be a direct tax, subject to the onerous 
apportionment rule, or whether it might be treated 
as a "tax on incomes," exempted from apportion-
ment by the 16th Amendment.26 Despite what you 
might have read in the papers, those are not easy 
issues. 
Part I of the report describes the relevant portions 
of the individual mandate. Part II explains why the 
taxing clause cannot provide authority for the man-
date as a whole, why the penalty should not be 
treated as a tax, and why, therefore, any further 
consideration of the taxing power should be urmec-
essary. Part ill explains why, if the penalty will be 
treated as a tax, the charge might be considered a 
capitation tax or some other form of direct tax, and 
why there is reason to doubt that the penalty, 
although sometimes measured by income, will be a 
tax on incomes, exempt from apportionment tmder 
the 16th Amendment. Finally, Part IV discusses why 
the commerce clause cannot trmnp limitations in 
the Constitution on the taxing power - if the 
penalty will be a tax. 
I. The Individual Mandate: Nuts and Bolts 
Section 1501 of the PPACA added new section 
5000A to the code, effective for tax years ending 
after 2013. That provision creates a requirement to 
maintain minimum essential coverage: "An appli-
cable individual shall for each month begirming 
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any 
dependent of the individual who is an applicable 
individual, is covered tmder minimum essential 
coverage for such month."27 With some exceptions 
not relevant for present purposes, an applicable 
individual is a citizen or national of the United 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (divided panel upholding 
constitutionality of individual mandate under the commerce 
clause and rejecting the argument that the individual mandate 
penalty is a tax that would divest the court of jurisdiction under 
the Anti-lnjunction Act); supra note 8. At the district court level, 
Judge George Caram Steeh concluded that Congress had power 
under the commerce clause to enact the PPACA, and he 
therefore denied declaratory and injunctive relief to parties 
challenging its constitutionality. On tax issues, Steeh noted only 
that relief under the Anti-[njunction Act was unavailable be-
cause, with the relevant provisions not going into effect until 
2014, the IRS had as yet made no effort to collect anything that 
might be characterized as a tax. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 
720 F. Supp.2d 882, 890-891 (E.D. Mich. 2010), Doc 2010-22007, 
2010 TNT 196-15. 
26 And perhaps we need to worry that the penalty might 
violate the uniformity rule if it is an indirect tax. See supra text 
accompanying note 20. I argue later, however, that uniformity is 
not a serious concern here. See infra text accompanying notes 
133-136. 
27Section 5000A(a). 
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States or a resident alien.28 Qualifying insurance 
includes a government-sponsored plan (like Medi-
care or Medicaid), an employer-provided plan, or 
other plan designated by the HHS secretary.29 
If an applicable individual fails to acquire mini-
mum essential coverage for herself (or for other 
applicable individuals for whom she is respon-
sible), the statute will impose a penalty to be paid 
with the individual's income tax return for the 
relevant tax year.30 The amount of the penalty will 
generally be determined for each month for which 
the applicable individual does not have minimum 
essential coverage. 
Computing the amotmt of the charge requires 
working through some eye-glazing statutory lan-
guage, but the structure is simpler for many persons 
than it first appears.31 In general, subject to a cap 
that I shall describe momentarily, the annual pen-
alty (assuming an applicable individual does not 
have insurance for the entire 12 months32) will be 
the greater of two figures: (1) a flat dollar amatmt 
equal to the "applicable dollar amount" per appli-
cable individuaP3 ($95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 
2016, and $695 indexed for inflation thereafter), 
with the total flat dollar amount (if multiple appli-
cable individuals are affected) not to exceed 300 
percent of the applicable dollar amoLmt34 ; or (2) a 
percentage (1 percent in 2014, 2 percent in 2015, and 
2.5 percent in 2016 and thereafter) of the figure by 
which household income exceeds what is com-
monly called the "filing threshold."35 Household 
income is the MAGI of a person and her depen-
dents, meaning AGI as we know and love the 
concept,36 increased by an.y foreign-earned income 
28Section 5000A(d). Exceptions from the definition of appli-
cable individual include practitioners of some religions, mem-
bers of healthcare-sharing ministries, illegal aliens, and 
incarcerated persons. Section 5000A(d)(2)-(4). 
29Section 5000A(f) (defining minimum essential coverage). 
30Section 5000A(b)(1) and (2). 
31
"Simpler" does not, however, mean "simple." 
32[£ the i.t<dividual fails to have minimum essential coverage 
for only part of the year, the penalty will in effect be prorated. 
33For an applicable individual under age 18, the dollar figure 
will be halved for purposes of most of the computations. See 
section 5000A(c)(3)(C). 
34Section 5000A(c)(2)(A)(ii). [n no event, therefore, should 
the total flat dollar amount, taking into account all applicable 
individuals for whom the taxpayer is responsible, exceed 300 
percent of the flat dollar amount listed. For a family with eight 
applicable individuals, none of whom has qualifying insurance, 
the flat dollar amount for 2014 would therefore be $285, 300 
percent of $95. For 2016 the figure would be $2,085, 300 percent 
of $695. 
35Section 5000A(c)(2). 
36 AGI is gross income as defined in section 61, rEO_duced by 
the deductions listed in section 62- generally, but not entirely, 
deductions associated with business and investment activities. 
Section 62(a). 
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not taxed in the United States and by the amount of 
any tax-exempt interest.37 (Think of MAGI as 
bulked-up AGI.) The filing threshold is the amount 
of1income a taxpayer must have before any income 
tax liability arises - basically the sum of the 
standard deduction and the exemption amount for 
the applicable individuaPB 
A visual aid might help make the apparently 
incomprehensible comprehensible. Let us assume 
that we are looking only at single taxpayers who 
have no dependents (that is, no other applicable 
individuals for whom they are responsible).39 If we 
continue to ignore the cap, it seems as though the 
amount to be paid as a penalty in any year by 
someone who does not acquire minimum essential 
coverage will be, in: 
.. 2014: the greater of $95 or 1 percent of house-
hold income above the filing threshold40; 
.. 2015: the greater of $325 or 2 percent of house-
hold income above the filing threshold41 ; 
.. 2016: the greater of $695 or 2.5 percent of 
household iilcome above the filing threshold42; 
and in 
.. 2017 and thereafter: the greater of $695, ad-
justed for inflation, or 2.5 percent of household 
income above the filing tlu·eshold. 
It seems tl1at the ammmt of the penalty for any 
high-income taxpayer will be the percentage-of-
income figure. 
But that is misleading. All this will be subject to 
a cap, which makes the comparison of the two 
figures ultimately irrelevant for many persons. In 
no event will the penalty in any year be greater than 
the national average premium for plans, available 
tl1rough an exchange, that offers a bronze level of 
coverage.43 The PPACA is silent about how that 
determination will be made, but the general idea is 
37Section 5000A(c)(4)(B) and (C). 
38Section 5000A(c)(2)(B) and (e)(2). 
391 make this unrealistic assumption for purposes of simpli-
fication. It does not affect the validity of the analysis. 
4
°For 2014 the percentage figure will be higher than the flat 
dollar amount if MAGI exceeds the filing threshold by at least 
$9,500. 
41 For 2015 the percentage figure will be higher than the flat 
dollar amount penalty if MAGI exceeds the filing threshold by 
at least $16,250. 
42For 2016 the percentage figure will be higher than the flat 
dollar amount if MAGI exceeds the filing threshold by at least 
$27,800. 
43Section 5000A(c)(1)(B). Bronze-level coverage provides 
benefits that are equivalent actuarially to 60 percent of the full 
actuarial benefits provided under a plan. See PPACA section 
1302. 
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that an individual should not have to pay more as a 
penalty than she would have to pay for decent, but 
not lavish, coverage. 
The real bottom line is that the annual penalty for 
any particular uninsured or underinsured person 
who is not exempted from the system will be one of 
three figures: (1) the flat dollar amount, which will 
set the floor; (2) the percentage-of-income number, 
which will apply if it is higher, unless that figure 
exceeds the cap; or (3) the average national cost of 
bronze-level coverage, in which case the cap will be 
the amount of the penalty. 
The statute contains some relief provisions ex-
empting specified persons from the penalty. For 
example, no penalty will be imposed if the cost of 
coverage for any month is greater than 8 percent of 
the applicable individual's household income; if the 
individual's income is below the federal poverty 
line; if the individual is a member of an American 
Indian tribe; if the individual fails to obtain cover-
age for fewer than tmee consecutive months; or if 
the individual is a hardship case as determined by 
the HHS secretary. 44 
II. The Penalty Will Be a Penalty 
As noted in the introduction, I find it difficult to 
tmderstand the argument that the taxing clause 
provides authority to mandate the purchase of 
insurance. Someone who follows the mandate and 
buys insurance will not be obligated to make any 
payment to the government (unless the person has 
government-provided insurance). In what sense is a 
"tax, duty, impost, or excise" being imposed on 
someone who purchases insurance from a private 
carrier or who receives coverage through an 
employer-provided plan, even if she does so only 
because of the mandate? If, say, the statute had 
required that health coverage be acquired, period, 
with no exceptions and with no monetary penalty 
for noncompliance, would any legal scholar have 
thought of characterizing the obligation to buy 
insurance as a tax?45 An economist might attribute 
44Section SOOOA(e); see also supra note 28 (noting exceptions to 
the definition of applicable individual). It has been suggested 
that the existence of these exceptions might affect whether the 
penalty is characterized as a capitation tax or a tax on incomes, 
although I will argue to the contrary. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 170-173 (arguing that a tax might still be a capitation 
tax even if not all persons are subject to the levy) and text 
accompanying notes 198-201 (arguing that a tax is not "on 
incomes" simply because low-income taxpayers are exempted 
from its scope). 
45Even without a monetary penalty, most people would 
follow the dictate, just as most would stop at a stop sign in the 
middle of the Mojave Desert. 
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taxlike effects to all sorts of governmental mcul.-
dates, including this one, but that does not make the 
obligation a tax for legal purposes. 
If you are in a metaphysical frame of mind, you 
might conceptualize a payment grudgingly made to 
purchase insurance as having been transferred to 
the government and then retransferred to an insur-
ance company. You might do that, but most folks 
would not. Even if made as a result of governmen-
tal encouragement or a governmental directive, a 
payment to an insurance company (or a payment 
made on a person's behalf to an insurance com-
pany) is not a tax as we ordinarily Lmderstand that 
term in the law.46 
The federal government, via Sebelius, has argued 
that the individual mandate will be "revenue-
raising[, and] the associated regulatory provisions 
bear a reasonable relation to the statute's taxing 
purpose,"47 as if the statute were fundamentally a 
taxing provision. The penalty will bring in some 
revenue to the treasury, to be sure,48 but that is 
hardly its purpose. Seeing the individual mandate 
as having a central taxing purpose turns the statu-
tory struchtre upside-down. It is requiring the ac-
quisition of insmance that is the heart of the stah1te. 
The penalty has no raison d'etre other than to 
46For example, we do not consider payments of antitrust 
treble damages or punitive damages to be taxes, even though 
the payments are mandated by government. Cf J. Kenneth 
Blackwell and Kenneth A. Klukowski, "Why the ObamaCare 
Tax Penalty Is Unconstitutional," The Wall Street Journal, July 22, 
2010, at A19 ("The government ... is commanding [private 
individuals] to give their money to another private entity; not 
the Treasury"). Although Blackwell and Klukowski nailed this 
basic point, [ disagree with most of the rest of their analysis. For 
example, they write that the original Constitution "allowed only 
three types of taxes," id., but the taxing clause gives Congress 
the power to "lay ... Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." U.S. 
Canst. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1. That is four types of taxation right 
there. They write that "the only type of direct tax permitted by 
the Constitution was a 'capitation tax."' Blackwell and 
Klukowski, supra. But the Constitution refers to "Capitation, or 
other direct, Tax," U.S. Canst. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4 (emphasis 
added), clearly suggesting that other direct taxes are possible. 
Further, the Constitution did not altogether prohibit any direct 
tax; instead, it required only that a direct tax be "apportioned 
among the several States ... according to their respective Num-
bers." U.S. Canst. Art. I, section 2, cL 3. And apportionment did 
not mean that "every person in a given state had to pay the 
same amount." Blackwell and Klukowski, supra; see infra Part 
IILA (discussing workings of apportionment). 
47Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp.2d at 612. 
48The Congressional Budget Office estimates penalties total-
ing $4.2 billion in 2016, enough to pay for a few White House 
parties. CBO, "Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured 
Under the Patient and Affordable Care Act" (Apr. 22, 2010), Doc 
2010-8974, 2010 TNT 78-32 
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strengthen that mandate; it would make no concep-
tual sense as a stand-alone provision.49 
If the taxing clause will be applicable at all in this 
context, it must be in evaluating the legitimacy of 
the penalty imposed on those who do not acquire 
minimum essential coverage. Here, too, I cun skep-
tical about the clause's relevance. Congress called 
the charge a penalty, and I see no reason to question 
that characterization. It is a penalty as we ordinarily 
understand that term: a punishment for not engag-
ing in desired behavior or for engaging in disfa-
vored behavior. Also, Congress specified that with a 
couple of exceptions, "the penalty ... shall be as-
sessed and collected in the same ma11.ner as an 
assessable penalty,"50 and section 6671 provides 
that assessable penalties "shall be assessed and 
collected in the same manner as taxes."Sl The penalty 
may thus be like a tax in some respects, but Con-
gress really went out of its way not to call it a tax. 52 
Congress did call an applicable individual who will 
have to pay a penalty a taxpayer, 53 but here, too, the 
stah1tory language is clear: "There is hereby im-
posed on the taxpayer a penalty."54 Not all charges 
paid by taxpayers to governments are taxes. 
Congress has historically imposed charges that 
were called taxes but were in effect penalties. This 
49 But see Edward D. Kleinbard, "Constitutional Kreplach," 
Tax Notes, Aug. 16, 2010, p. 755, Doc 2010-15640, or 2010 TNT 
159-3 (noting that "it is natural to have a visceral reaction that 
section 5000A(b) should not properly be characterized as a tax, 
because it is not primarily designed to collect revenue, but to 
compel behavior," but then suggesting that the modern Su-
preme Court has largely ignored that distinction as long as some 
revenue is likely to be raised). 
50Section 5000A(g)(1). 
51 Section 6671 (emphasis added). 
52[ thus disagree with Willis and Chung that "the act's 
penalty provision is styled as a tax," and "Congress arguably 
did this to finesse commerce clause problems." Willis and 
Chung, supra note 11, at 170; see also Con Law Brief, supra note 
9, at 14 and n.3 (arguing that the individual mandate "on its face 
purports to be an exercise of the taxing power" - quoting 
Sonzins!cy v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) - because it 
was added to the code, the provision "references taxpayers and 
tax returns," and so on). A penalty imposed as part of the 
enforcement of a legitin1ate tax would presumably be autho-
rized by the taxing clause. It would not matter in that case that 
the penalty is itself not a tax. Cf. United States v. Kahriger, 345 
U.S. 22, 25 (1953) (upholding a federal tax on "the business of 
accepting wagers," and stating that "unless there are [penalty] 
provisions extraneous to any tax need, courts are without 
authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power"). But a 
penalty unconnected with taxation must derive its authority 
from some constitutional provision other than the taxing clause 
-that a penalty might bring in revenue is not enough to make 
it a tax - and a nontax penalty does not become legitimate 
merely because it is placed within the code. 
53E.g., section 5000A(b)(l) and (c). 
54Section 5000A(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also section 
SODOA (c)(1) (referring to "the amount of the penalty imposed by 
this section on any taxpayer"). 
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was generally done in the distant past when there 
were questions about whether the commerce clause 
provided sufficient authority to regulate various 
commercial activities. And, yes, legitimate taxes can 
have penalty-like effects.55 The boundary between 
taxes and penalties is fuzzy,s6 courts are under-
standably reluctant to look to congressional motives 
in evaluating the legitimacy of charges,57 and often 
the distinction does not matter anyway for consti-
- h1tional purposes.58 The concepts are nevertheless 
not identical, and the distinction can matter.59 I will 
55Cf. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) ("It is 
beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid 
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely 
deters the activities taxed"). Tariffs or other taxes imposed on 
reports of consumption increase the cost of those goods, making 
them less attractive to consumers. In some circumstances at 
least, one might view such an increased cost for someone who 
buys a taxed good as a penalty. 
56Cf. Balkin, "The Constitutionality of an Individual Man-
date for Health Insurance," 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumln·a 102, 
105 (2009) ("If taxes that act as incentives to engage in socially 
desirable behavior and reduce the cost of government programs 
are unconstitutional, much of our tax system would be consti-
tutionally suspect"). Balkin's point is valid, but it is hardly 
determinative regarding any particular charge. And there is 
presumably a distinction to be drawn between imposing taxes 
as an incentive and exempting some amounts from taxation as 
an incentive. See Ruth Mason, "Federalism and the Taxing 
Power," 99 Cal. L. Rev. 975, 984-992 (2011) (distinguishing 
between two types of "tax regulation," "tax expenditures," and 
"tax penalties"). But see Ryan Lirette, "The Health Insurance 
Mandate: If It Must Be, Let It Be a Tax," Tax Notes, July 26, 2010, 
p. 415, Doc 2010-14305, or 2010 TNT 144-10 ("Many code 
provisions, including the charitable deduction, the child care 
credit, empowerment zones, and the low-income housing 
credit, are intended to affect personal behavior. Distinguishing 
between those presumably constitutional provisions and a 
penalty may be complicated"). In what sense is a benefit of that 
sort- a reduction in tax liability if specified behavior is engaged 
in - ever going to be characterized as a penalty on someone 
who takes advantage of the benefit? (I might feel aggrieved if 
someone else is getting a tax benefit, but it strikes me as peculiar 
to use the term "penalty" to refer to my sense of distress.) Some 
have equated not taking advantage of available deductions to a 
penalty because the result is higher tax liability. See, e.g., 
Leonard Burman, CNN Money (Apr. 10, 2010), quoted in Willis 
and Chung, supra note 11, at 187. Yes, you pay more tax if you 
do not donate an extra dollar to charity, but calling that result a 
penalty also strikes me as a stretch. (Assuming your marginal 
rate is less than 100 percent, you are still better off economically 
if you do not make the contribution.) 
57 See Lirette, supra note 56, at 423. 
58Many penalties will be valid anyway under the commerce 
clause or some other provision in Article I, section 8. As noted 
earlier, a penalty imposed to carry out a legitimate taxing 
function would presumably be validated by the taxing clause, 
see supra note 52, although the commerce clause might also 
provide authority. If such a penalty were recharacterized as a 
tax, it would still be valid if it were an indirect tax that satisfied 
the 1.miforrn.ity rule, see infra Part ill.A, and that should be the 
case with many penalties. 
59
"The difference between a tax and a penalty is sometimes 
difficult to define and yet the consequences of the distinction in 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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rehlrn to the constitutional history associated with 
taxation and regulation in Part II.A. Suffice it to say 
for now that although the Supreme Court has 
generally abandoned the attempt to make "distinc-
tions between regulatory and revenue-rmsmg 
taxes"6D - no tax is entirely one or the other - at 
no time has the Supreme Court held that Congress 
can define anything it wishes as a tax. 
Because the taxing clause is an independent 
grant of power to Congress in Article I, section 8 -
a tax may be valid tmder that clause even if it would 
not withstand scrutiny under the commerce 
clause61 - it has become distressingly common for 
some members of Congress to use the language of 
taxation for legislation that is otherwise not taxlike. 
It should go without saying, but will not, that not all 
charges imposed by governments are taxes.62 The 
federal government's power to impose an entry fee 
to national parks, for example, or to charge for 
meals in a federal building cafeteria - easy cases -
obviously does not come from the taxing clause. 
Also - this is the key point for present purposes -
the congressional power to impose penalties for 
violation of rules does not come from the taxing 
clause, unless the rules being violated are those 
associated with taxation.63 
the required method of their collection often are import-
ant. ... Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the 
legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of 
obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive of 
discouraging them by malcing their continuance onerous. They 
do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental 
motive. But there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing 
features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such 
and becomes a mere penalty with the cl1aracteristics of regula-
tion and punishment." Bailey v. Drexel Fumiture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 
38 (1922). One might question whether the result in the child 
labor tax case is still good law, see infra Part II.B, but these points 
still make sense and the case has not been overruled. See infra 
note 123. 
60Bob jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974). 
61 That could be the case, for example, if the levy has nothing 
to do with foreign or interstate commerce or with commerce 
with the Indian tribes (assuming that situation can exist). 
62In fact, I said this a few paragraphs ago, and I will say it 
agairJ. Richard Darman's widely quoted ditty- if "it looks like 
a duclc, quacks like a duck, and walks like a duck, it's a duck" 
-was not helpful in this regard. Quoted in Ellin Rosenthal and 
Pat Jones, "Year in Review: From Germany to the Tax Code, the 
Walls Begin to Tumble - a Look at the 101st Congress," Tax 
Notes, Jan. 1, 1990, p. 16. Office of Management and Budget 
Director-designate Darman was interpreting the first President 
Bush's "no new taxes" pledge, and his statement came to stand 
for the wrong-headed proposition that any governmental 
charge is an aquatic bird. See also Lirette, supra note 56, at 422 
(noting that "the mandate's penalty provision compels a mon-
etar~ payment to the govem . -nent, similar to all taxes"). 
The government's argument that "numerous provisions in 
the Internal Revenue Code impose assessments that are de-
scribed as 'penalties,"' and that "the constitutionality of these 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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One widely noted recent example of an attempt 
to cloak a penalty in the garb of taxation was a 
proposed tax, not enacted (although it did pass the 
House in 2009), intended to reach bonuses paid to 
employees or former employees of AIG Inc. and 
other significant recipients of Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) funds- that is, bailout flmds paid 
to financial institutions during the financial crisis.64 
The version of the bill that passed the House would 
have taxed an affected bonus at a 90 percent rate for 
any employee or former employee with AGI ex-
ceeding $250,000, if the company granting the bo-
nus received more than $5 billion in TARP flmds. 
The 90 percent rate would have applied to the 
bonus regardless of the marginal rate otherwise 
applicable to the bonus recipient. In short, this 
legislation was an attempt to claw back bonuses 
that Congress considered unseemly.6s And pretty 
clearly the drafters crafted the clawback as a tax 
because they were tmsure of their authority to get 
the desired results tmder the commerce clause. 
Prof. Laurence Tribe initially blessed the claw-
back as an exercise of the taxing power, 66 but he 
soon had second thoughts. He became concerned 
about the congressional pique that was driving the 
exercises of the General Welfare Clause is not in doubt," 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
judgment, Virginia ex rei. Cuccinelli, No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH, at 
20 n.5 (Sept. 23, 2010), is hardly conclusive. I concede that 
penalties associated with failing to satisfy one's tax obligations 
can derive their authority from the taxing clause, see supra note 
52, but that is not what the individual mandate penalty is about. 
And penalties for failure to meet other obligations must derive 
their authority from elsewhere in the Constitution. (I under-
stand that Balkin disagrees. He has argued that penalties for 
failure to comply with pollution control standards, for example, 
are authorized by the taxing clause because the penalty is on 
those contributing to social problems that Congress is trying to 
deal with. Balkin, supra note 56, at 103; Balkin, supra note 21, at 
482. That claim basically would make any penalty into a tax. In 
my view, the key question is whether Congress has the relevant 
authority to regulate environmental matters to begin with. If it 
does, associated penalties will be valid. If it does not, the 
penalties will not magically become valid because of the taxing 
clause.) 
64H.R. 1586, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., passed the House by a 
328-93 vote on March 19, 2009. 
65Even though the bonuses were paid by the companies and 
the tax would have been paid to the government, the term 
"clawback" is appropriate here. The persons who would have 
been subject to the tax had all been employed by companies that 
received substantial bailout money from the government. In 
effect this was to be a repayment to the government of bailout 
funds that seemed to have been paid out as bonuses. 
66See Ashby Jones, "Would an AIG-Bonus Tax Pass Consti-
tutional Muster? (A Tribe Calls 'Yes!')," The Wall Street Journal 
Blogs (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http:/ /blogs.wsj.com/law I 
2009 I 03 /18 I would-an-aig-bonus-tax -pass-constitutional-must 
er-a-tribe-calls-yes. 
104 
proposals. 67 It was obvious from the way many 
members of Congress were talking, both on and off 
the floor, that ptmishment, not revenue-raising, was 
the goal, as a report from the Congressional Re-
search Service noted. 68 
In an earlier report, I argued that the proposed 
tax on bonuses was the rare case in which a 
purported tax might cross the line and be an invalid 
taking of property without just compensation.69 In 
form, the legislation was written using impersonal 
language - the House bill would have applied to a 
"TARP bonus," described in terms of a "disquali-
fied bonus payment," paid to "an employee or 
former employee of a covered TARP recipient"70 -
but everyone knew who the targets were. A close-
to-confiscatory rate of taxation (90 percent) would 
have applied to a discrete body of taxpayers and for 
carefully described property. That sounds more like 
a taking than a tax. 71 
Had the suspect "tax" on bonuses been enacted, 
I concede that it would have been difficult for a 
bonus recipient to have successfully brought a 
challenge.72 Courts are Lmlikely to resist Congress's 
exercise of the taxing power, and, except in special 
circumstances, courts will not sh·ike down a charge 
67See "Law Professor Who Advises Obama Says House AlG 
Bill May Be Unconstitutional," The Plum Line, Greg Sargent's 
Blog (Mar. 23, 2009), available at http:/ /theplumline.who 
runsgov.com/ economy /law-professor-who-advised-obama-sa 
ys-house-aig-bill-may-be-unconstitutional. 
68See Erika K. Lunder eta!., "Retroactive Taxation of Execu-
tive Bonuses: Constitutionality of H.R. 1586 and S. 651," CRS, at 
summary page (Mar. 25, 2009), Doc 2009-6788, 2009 TNT 57-35 
(noting that a "review of the legislative history established so 
far ... seems to indicate that raising revenue is not a primary 
purpose behind the proposed bills. Rather, the legislative his-
tory seems to contain comments that would indicate the exist-
ence of a congressional intent to punish those individuals 
receiving bonuses"). 
69Erik M. Jensen, "Would a Tax on AIG Bonus Recipients 
Really Be a Tax?" Tax Notes, May 25, 2009, p. 1033, Doc 
2009-9186, 2009 TNT 98-12. 
70H.R. 1586, supra note 64, at section l(b). 
71 In this case the property taken would have been cash, and 
ordinarily we would not think that the government's requiring 
someone to give up cash is a "taking" requiring just compen-
sation. What would the point be of requiring compensation in 
cash for a taking of cash? (That is one reason a legitimate tax is 
not considered a taking.) But the bonus clawback might have 
been the exceptional case in which applying takings doctrine to 
analyze a "tax" would have been necessary. Or, alternatively, 
the clawback might have been characterized as a deprival of 
property without due process. A governmental taking of prop-
erty for a public purpose requires compensation, see U.S. Canst. 
Amend. V; a fortiori, a governmental taking without a public 
pu~ose should require compensation. 
For one thing, many bonus recipients would not have 
wanted to argue in public that they were entitled to huge 
bonuses in difficult economic times. 
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_ that Congress calls a tax. 73 That judicial reluctance is 
a matter of deference more than principle - un-
questionably there are governmental charges that 
are not taxes and are therefore not blessed by the 
taxing clause - but deference counts for a great 
deal in the real world. 
The individual mandate penalty will not even 
arguably be a taking, but neither will it be a tax as 
that term is usually understood. If a penalty for 
engaging or not engaging in a particular behavior 
would have been understood by the Founders as a 
tax, the taxing clause would have trumped many 
other provisions in Article I, section 8.74 It would 
have provided an unintended route to enormous 
congressional power.75 The taxing clause is an inde-
pendent grant of power - it might permit levies 
that are not related to commerce or other areas 
within congressional power- but a charge must be 
a tax to be permitted by the taxing clause. 
1 In any event, there is an important and obvious 
difference between Congress's occasional attempts 
to use the taxing power as the basis for imposing 
something that is not a tax and what Congress has 
done with the individual mandate penalty. It may 
be true, as the Supreme Court said in 1919, that 
"from an early day the Court has held that the fact 
that other motives may impel the exercise of federal 
taxing power does not authorize courts to inquire 
into that subject."76 But whatever the appropriate 
level of deference when Congress says it is impos-
ing a tax, the individual mandate does not present 
that situation: Congress did not call the penalty a tax. 
Indeed, as the legislation worked its way through 
Congress, the label was changed from "excise" or 
73For special circwnstances, see United States v. United States 
Shoe Corp., 523 US 360 (1998), Doc 98-10958, 98 TNT 62-12 
(striking down application of taxing statute as violation of the 
export clause, U.S. ConsL ArL I, section 9, cl. 5); United States v. 
Int'l Bus. MacllS. Corp., 517 US 843 (1996) (to same effect). See 
also Erik M. Jensen, "TI1e Export Clause," 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 1 (2003). 
In United States Shoe, the government was in the awkward 
position of having to argue (unsuccessfully) that what Congress 
had labeled the harbor maintenance tax was a user fee, and 
therefore not an invalid "tax or duty" as it applied to exported 
reports. 
74 See supra note 52. If a tax is direct, however, it would have 
to be apportioned, see infra Part ill.A, making a direct tax an 
inefficient method of regulation in most cases. 
75I like the characterization of the penalty as a "tax on 
uninsurance." See Randall R. Bovbjerg, "Are State Challenges to 
the Legality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Likely to Succeed?" in Urban Institute, Timely Analysis of Im-
mediate Health Policy Issues, at 2 (June 10, 2010) (emphasis 
added). Kleinbard has characterized it as "a penalty (or tax, take 
your pick) on the provision of healthcare self-insurance." Klein-
bard, supra note 49, at 756; see also Willis and Chung, supra note 
11, at 180 ("This is a fee for self-insuring by doing nothing") 
(footnote omitted). 
76United States v. Doremus, 249 US 86, 93 (1919). 
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"tax" to "penalty/' as if Congress knew it was not 
exercising the taxing power?? And the legislative 
findings supporting the constitutionality of the in-
dividual mandate have no connection to the taxing 
power; they are all tied to regulation of commerce.78 
On that fundamental point, I thus disagree with 
Prof. Steven Willis and Nakku Chung, who wrote 
that "the healthcare act's penalty provision looks 
like a tax, which is what the drafters ultimately 
intended."79 If the drafters really intended this, they 
did a terrific job of hiding it.so 
77See supra text accompanying notes 10-1L The term "excise" 
was not used in the PPACA, but for what it is worth, new 
section SOOOA falls within a subtitle titled "Misce!Janeous Excise 
Taxes." I think tl1e placement is worth almost nothing. Cf 
section 7806(b): 
No inference, implication, or preswnption of legislative 
construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the 
location or grouping of any particular section or provi-
sion or portion of this title [26, the Internal Revenue 
Code], nor sha!J any table of contents, table of cross 
references, or similar outline, analysis, or descriptive 
matter related to the contents of this title be given any 
legal effect. 
Try explaining to law students struggling with the clistinc-
tion between above-the-line and below-the-line deductions why 
section 162, the ordinary and necessary business expense pro-
vision, is found in a part of the IRC called "Itemized Deductions 
for Individuals and Corporations," when sometimes business 
deductions are itemized and sometimes tl1ey are not (see section 
62), and when there is no sucl1 thing as an itemized deduction 
for a corporation. See also Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 184-186 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), Doc 2007-15777,2007 TNT 129-4, cert. denied, 553 
U.S. 1004 (2008) (concluding tl1at tax on recovery for emotional 
distress could be classified as an excise for constitutional 
purposes, even though the recovery was arguably included as 
part of gross income in computing income tax liability). 
78See supra note 5. In a memorandum for summary judgment 
filed on September 3, 2010, in the Virginia litigation, Sebelius 
argued that further legislative findings were unnecessary: "It is 
fair to presume that a provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
that deals with amounts calculated as a percentage of gross 
income to be paid by 'taxpayers' with their 'tax returns,' is an 
exercise of the taxing power. There was accordingly no need to 
make detailed findings to support its exercise [of] this power." 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, at 43, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH 
(E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 2010). I understand that because of the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), Congress felt it necessary to make detailed findings 
under the commerce clause. And I understand congressional 
reluctance to call a marge a tax in a decidedly antitax environ-
ment. But if Congress clid not want to be seen as relying on the 
taxing power and therefore did not make appropriate findings, 
that decision should have consequences for our understanding 
of the PPACA 
79Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 181. 
80Profs. Metzger and Morrison argue that "there are the 
features of the provision that plainly identify it as a tax - tl1e 
way it amends the Internal Revenue Code, for example, tl1e fact 
that the penalty is included on annual tax returns, and the fact 
that the money the government receives from payment of the 
penalty goes into the general fisc." Gillian Metzger and Trevor 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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Willis and Chung accepted the penalty as a tax 
but still rejected its constitutionality. I also question 
the analysis of several commentators who came to 
the diametric conclusion. For example, the consti-
tutional law professors who filed amicus briefs in 
several cases, including the Virginia litigation, ar-
gued that "today, any scrutiny the Court devotes to 
the purposes underlying a tax measure focuses on 
ensuring it is not a criminal imposition in dis-
guise."s1 That strikes me as too strong a statement 
to begin with82 and, more important, it is beside the 
point. The individual mandate does not purport to 
be a "tax measure!" So, too, I question the relevance 
of Prof. Brian Galle's description of Supreme Court 
authority: "If a provision that is labeled as a tax raises 
any revenue, it is within the taxing power."83 The 
"penalty" is not labeled as a tax, it has the trappings 
of a penalty, and Congress did not try to lude the 
penalty in tax bafflegab.84 
The commentators relying on the taxing clause as 
authority for the penalty mix up two distinct ques-
tions. Question number 1- Can a charge that is not 
labeled as a tax be characterized as one?- has an 
easy answer: Yes. If Congress calls a levy on the 
importation of beef a "dingbat," the levy would still 
be valid as a duty or impost (assuming the Lrni-
formity rule is satisfied), even though the taxing 
clause makes no reference to dingbats.s5 But the 
second question is different: Must we defer to 
Congress's powers under the taxing clause when 
Congress has not characterized a charge as a tax? 
Morrison, "Health Care Reform, the Tax Power, and the Pre-
sumption of Constitutionality," Balkinization (Oct. 19, 2010), 
available at http:/ /balkin.blogspot.com/. But being in the code 
does not make a charge a tax, see supra text accompanying note 
14, nor does having to make an entry on a tax return. And surely 
many penalty payments go into the general coffers, as do most 
(but not all) tax payments. 
81 Con Law Brief, supra note 9, at 12 (citing Dr:p't of Revenue v. 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779-783 (1994), Doc 94-5384, 94 TNT 
109-1 (holding that a tax on drugs was criminal punishment and 
that its imposition in particular circumstances violated the 
double jeopardy clause). 
82As I discuss in Part II.B, with the expansion in the scope of 
the commerce clause, the tax-nontax distinction is not nearly as 
important as it used to be, so it is not surprising that scrutiny 
todal,: is less stringent than in the past. 
8 Brian Galle, "Conditional Taxation and the Constitutional-
ity of Health Care Reform," 120 Yale L.f. Online 27, 29 (2010) 
(emphasis added). I think Galle's point about the need for 
administrable, justiciable limits is misplaced as well: "That the 
Court has found no justiciable limits on the spending power 
necessarily implies a similar lack of limit on the taxing power." 
Id. If Congress has not purported to be exercising its taxing 
power, what difficulty does a court face in deciding that no 
deference under the taxing clause is appropriate? 
84 As I noted earlier, including the penalty in the IRC and 
giving enforcement power to the IRS do not make a penalty into 
a tax. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
85See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. 
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Congress will get the benefit of the doubt in consti-
tutional analysis anyway - if at all possible, a 
statute will be read in a way consistent with consti-
tutional mandates - but I do not understand the 
argument that a court should defer to a character-
ization Congress did not make. 
These points are similar to those made by Judge 
Roger Vinson in the Florida litigation in denying the 
government's motion to dismiss.86 Vinson inter-
preted the Supreme Court's 1903 decision in Helwig 
v. United States87 as standing for the proposition that 
"regardless of whether the exaction could otherwise 
qualify as a tax ... it cannot be regarded as one if it 
'clearly appears' that Congress did not intend it to 
be,"88 and Congress's intentions with the individual 
mandate penalty were clear. Congress explicitly 
called other provisions in the PPACA "taxes," so it 
knew how to use that label when it wanted to.s9 
And Congress had used different language in ear-
lier versions of the statute: "Congress's conspicuous 
decision to not use the term 'tax' in the Act when 
referring to the exaction (as it had done in at least 
three earlier incarnations of the legislation) is sig-
nificant."90 The rule of deference: 
must be set aside when it is clear and manifest 
that Congress intended the exaction to be 
regarded as one and not the other. ... To the 
extent that the label ... is achtally indicative of 
legislative purpose and intent, it very much 
does matter. By deliberately changing the 
characterization of the exaction from a "tax" to 
a "penalty," but at the same time including 
many other "taxes" in the Act, it is manifestly 
clear that Congress intended it to be a penalty 
and not a tax. 91 
86I note for the record that [ made these points in an earlier 
draft of this report that was available on SSRN in late September 
2010, and Vinson's opinion appeared on October 14, 2010. [ 
claim no cause-and-effect, however. Indeed, I claim no original-
ity; these points should have been obvious lo any careful 
student of the situation. 
87188 U.S. 605 (1903). 
88Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp.2d 
1120, 1133 (N.D. Fla. 2010), Doc 2010-22392, 2010 TNT 199-7. 
89Id. at 1134-1135. 
90Id. at 1134. 
91 Id. at 1135-1136. Vinson dealt with other issues in Florida v. 
HHS, 780 F. Supp.2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), Doc 2011-2175, 2011 
TNT 21-8, and a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit agreed 
that the individual mandate is unconstitutional, explicitly con-
cluding that it was not a valid exercise of the taxing power. Sec 
Florida Attomey General v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1313-1320 (11th 
Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17561, 2011 TNT 158-14, cert. granted (Nov. 
14, 2011). Vmson had also concluded, however, that the indi-
vidual mandate could not be severed from the rest of the 
PPACA, and the entire act had to fall. The Eleventh Circuit 
rejected that conclusion. Id. at 1320-1328. 
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Profs. Gillian Metzger and Trevor Morrison com-
plain that "the obvious lesson of [Vinson's] ap-
proach is that Congress should expressly invoke all 
possible constitutional bases for legislation or risk 
being found to have given some up."92 But that 
misses the point: In this case, Congress did give up 
the language of taxation, openly and notoriously; 
no inadvertence was involved. We know what 
emerged from Congress, and Vinson did not need 
to make difficult judgments about congressional 
motives and intentions. Metzger and Morrison ar-
gue that "the fact that a measure using the term 
'tax' actually was adopted by one chamber calls into 
question the district court's confident assertion that 
it was called a penalty so that members of Congress 
could 'insulate themselves from the possible elec-
toral ramifications of their votes."'93 Maybe that is 
so,94 but whatever the reason, the language changed 
and Congress did not call the individual mandate 
penalty a tax. 
If the primary check on the taxing power is 
political, and it is,95 it becomes all the more impor-
tant to take Congress at its word. Language matters, 
and if Congress can enact taxes without saying that 
is what it is doing, political safeguards are dis-
armed. How can the populace or anyone else be 
confident about the exercise of the national taxing 
power if Congress pointedly avoids using the lan-
guage of taxation.?96 
Balkin has used the term "penalty tax" to char-
acterize the penalty in the individual mandate,97 
and in litigation the govemment has referred to the 
individual mandate penalty as a "tax penalty,"98 as 
if that language would help with the constihitional 
issues. There are no such terms of art, however. The 
terms "penalty tax" and "tax penalty" have no 
constitutional significance,99 and in any event, Con-
92Metzger and Morrison, supra note 80. 
93Jd. 
94It seems to me just as likely that members of Congress had 
second thoughts once it became apparent that they could be 
seen as having supported a tax increase. 
95Indeed, the primary check on any exercise of congressional 
power is political. 
96Cf McCulloclz v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1818) 
(stressing the need for "confidence which is essential to alJ 
government" to temper concerns about the power of taxation, 
which is "the power to destroy"). 
97See Balkin, supra note 21, at 482. 
98See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Virginia v. Sibelius, No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH, 
at 19 (Sept. 23, 2010). 
99Cf. Mason, supra note 56, at 989-992 (referring to "what 
rrright be called tax penalties"). Mason gjves as examples of tax 
penalties disallowing deductions for "'excessive' employee re-
muneration," section 162(m), and taxing the income from traf-
ficking in ilJegal drugs but denying deductibility of related 
expenses, section 280E. 
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gress did not use either of those terms in the 
PPACA. The individual mandate penalty is a "tax, 
duty, impost, or excise," or it is not. 
A. Taxation and Regulation 
If the proposed tax on recipients of bonuses from 
companies receiving TARP funds could have been 
grounded in constihitionallanguage other than the 
taxing clause, the clawback would not have needed 
to be a tax to be constitutional. If Congress has the 
power under the commerce clause, say, to require 
disgorgement of what it considers to be ill-gotten 
gains, it does not seem to matter whether the 
charge would be a tax or not. (At least that is so if 
the "tax" is not subject to the direct tax apportion-
ment rule, about which more shortly.100) And, as 
congressional power increased in the 20th century 
- with the commerce clause in particular becom-
ing an apparently boundless grant of power - the 
taxation-versus-something-else issue declined in 
importance.101 
But Congress was contemplating a tax on bo-
nuses only because at least some members of Con-
gress thought they did not otherwise have the 
authority to claw back bonuses that were paid 
under valid contracts. And the taxing clause has 
come up as a justification for the individual man-
date because at least some supporters are nervous 
that the commerce clause is not up to the task. 
Whether Congress can use the taxin.g power to 
achieve goals that would otherwise be outside its 
power has a long history, with several significant 
cases decided in the late 19th and early 20t11 
centuries_ID2 Although that history unquestionably 
supports the idea that the taxing clause is an 
100See infra Part III. 
101 Cf South Carolina v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The [United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1 (1936)] Court saw the Agricultural Adjustment Act for what it 
was - an exercise of regulatory, not spending, power. The 
effort ... was not the Court's conclusion that the Act was 
essentialJy regulatory, but rather its crabbed view of the extent 
of Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause"). 
One might expect more judicial skepticism about taxation as 
regulation if the commerce clause's scope lessens. But despite 
the hoopla about United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(holding that the commerce clause does not permit Congress to 
do everything it rrright want to), and United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000) (ditto), that is not likely to happen much, if at alL 
See Jonathan H. Adler, "Is Mo1Tison Dead? Assessing a Supreme 
Dmg (Law) Overdose," 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 251 (2005). Even 
if the commerce clause continues to be broadly construed, 
however, there still can be instances in which the only possible 
justification for a purported tax will be the taxing clause. 
102By adjusting the amount of a tax and creating regulatory 
structures to enforce a tax, Congress could often get effects 
equivalent to direct regulation. If the amount of a tax is high 
enough, the taxed activity wilJ disappear altogether (except 
perhaps in illegal forms) - the ultimate form of "regulation." 
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independent grant of congressional power,103 that 
can be so only if a tax is involved. The clause 
provides authority for Congress to "lay and collect 
Taxes," nothing else. 104 No tax, no authority under 
the taxing clause. 
Even before the New Deal, cases concluding that 
a charge was not really a tax (and that the enact-
ment was otherwise outside congressional power) 
were exceptional. In general, to the dismay of some 
Supreme Court justices, the Court bent over back-
wards not to reject levies that Congress had charac-
terized as taxes. For example, in McCray v. United 
States,1°5 decided in 1903, the Court considered 
federal levies on margarine. In an 1886 act, Con-
gress provided for taxing yellow margarine at 10 
cents per pound, while margarine of other colors 
was taxed at only one-quarter cent per pound. 
Occupational taxes similarly varied depending on 
the type of margarine. The purpose behind the taxes 
was clear - to make margarine less competitive 
with butter - but the Court refused to look behind 
the form of the statute. The Court quoted an 1888 
opinion to the effect that "the judicial department 
cannot prescribe to the legislative department limi-
tations upon the exercise of its acknowledged 
powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppres-
sively upon persons; but the responsibility of the 
legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by 
whom its members are elected."I06 
Sonzinsky v. United States,107 a New Deal-era case, 
contains some of the most far-reaching language 
about deference to congressional characterizations. 
In Sonzinsky, the Court decided on the constitution-
ality of a license tax on dealers in firearms. The 
National Firearms Act defined firearms in such a 
way that it picked up disfavored weapons like 
sawed-off shotguns; the obvious purpose of the act 
was to gain federal control over the weapons. 
Taxpayer Sonzinsky argued that the levy was "not a 
true tax, but a penalty imposed for the purpose of 
103See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 
738 (1950) (stating that in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 
(1936), the Court "declared for the first time ... that, in confer-
ring power upon Congress to tax 'to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States,' the Constitution delegates a power separate and distinct 
from those later enumerated, and one not restricted by them"); 
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) ("Nor does a tax 
statute necessarily fail because it touches on activities which 
Con@ress might not otherwise regulate"). 
1 4A reminder: I am using the term "tax" to refer to all levies 
listed in the taxing clause: "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." 
See supra note 23. 
105195 u.s. 27 (1903). 
106Id. at 58 (quoting Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 355 
(1888)). 
107300 u.s. 506 (1937). 
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suppressing traffic in a certain noxious type of 
firearms, the local regulation of which is reserved to 
the states."108 It was assumed that Congress could 
not directly regulate those firearms - hence Con-
gress's reliance on the taxing power. 
In a Lmanimous decision, the Supreme Court 
upheld Congress's exercise of the taxing power in 
those circumstances. And the Court provided an 
amazingly generous interpretation of that power: 
A tax is not any the less a tax because it has a 
regulatory effect, ... and it has long been es-
tablished that an Act of Congress which on its 
face purports to be an exercise of the taxing 
power is not any the less so because the tax is 
burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress 
the thing taxed.1D9 
The levy looked like a tax, and "on its face," it 
purported to be "an exercise of the taxing power." It 
produced "some revenue,"110 and a little bit was 
enough. As in McCray, the Court refused to ques-
tion congressional motives: 
Inquiry into the hidden motives which may, 
move Congress to exercise a power constitu-
tionally conferred upon it is beyond the com-
petency of courts .... They will not Lmdertake, 
by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the 
regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Con-
gress an attempt, Lmder the guise of taxation, 
to exercise another power denied by the Fed-
eral Constitution.m 
The formalism embodied in tb.ose cases occasion-
ally prompted vigorous dissents. For example, in 
United States v. Kahriger, 112 decided in 1953, the Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of an oc-
cupational tax on persons engaged in the business of 
accepting wagers even though, as the majority ad-
mitted, the revenue generated was "negligible."113 
Dissenting Justice Felix Frankfurter complained: 
When oblique use is made of the taxing power 
as to matters which substantively are not 
within the powers delegated to Congress, the 
Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, 
108fd. at 512. 
109fd. at 513. 
110fd. at 514. 
111 [d. at 513-514; cf Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 
(1869) (upholding a tax on state bank notes, although the 
purpose of the tax was to drive notes out of existence). In Veazie 
Bank, the government had power to regulate the currency, so the 
tax at issue might have been valid even if not characterized as a 
tax. 
112345 U.S. 22 (1953). 
113Id. at 28. 
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because designedly, an attempt to control con-
duct which the Constitution left to the respon-
sibility of the states, merely because Congress 
wrapped the legislation in the verbal cello-
phane of a revenue measure.114 
But shut its eyes is what the Court did in Knhriger 
and many other cases involving regulatory use of 
taxation, such as levies on narcotics115 and mari-
juana.116 Two 1968 cases overruled Knhriger on 
issues relating to the constitutionality of registration 
and information requirements under a wagering tax 
statute; the rules were held to violate the privilege 
against self-incrimination. But the legitimacy of the 
taxing power as a method of regulating suspect 
activities was upheld.117 
The Supreme Court has generally deferred to 
Congress in this area, but occasionally the Court has 
looked through "verbal cellophane" to conclude 
that a charge was not really a tax (and that the 
enactment at issue was otherwise outside congres-
sional power). The best-known example is the Child 
Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.),118 
decided in 1922. Congress had used a purported tax 
(10 percent of the net profits of businesses "know-
ingly" employing children in violation of the terms 
of the statute) as a way to get around a 1918 
Supreme Court case, Hammer v. Dagenhart,11 9 which 
had held that Congress did not have power to 
regulate child labor. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft concluded that the usual deference to 
Congress in tax matters did not apply when, "on 
the very face of its provisions,"120 the levy was a 
penalty, not a tax. The scienter requirement was 
evidence that this was a penalty. Providing a 
"heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed and 
specified course of conduct in business," said the 
Court, was not consistent with the exercise of the 
taxing power.121 Presumably some justices were 
irritated, too, by Congress's haste in trying to use 
the taxing power to effect results the Court had just 
held could not be achieved through direct regula-
tion. 
114Jd. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
115United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); see also Minor 
v. United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969). 
116 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); see also Leary v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
117Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. 
United Slates, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); see also United States v. Knox, 396 
U.S. 77 (1969). 
118259 u.s. 20 (1922). 
119247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
120259 U.S. 20 at 38. 
121 Jd. at 36. 
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The narrow holding of the Child Labor Tax Case 
is no longer relevant because the Court later over-
ruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, making it clear that 
Congress has the power to regulate child labor 
straightforwardly.122 And the Child Labor Tax Case 
was unusual in the extent to which it evidenced 
judicial skepticism of the taxing power. 
But the Child Labor Tax Case, which has not been 
overruled, demonstrates that there can be some 
charges that are not actually taxes and are therefore 
invalid if Congress does not otherwise have the 
power to regulate the "taxed" activity. Maybe those 
cases are few and far between - one hopes Con-
gress will legislate in a way not intended to push 
the constitutional envelope - but Congress's 
power to tax, while broad, is not limitless. Despite 
the deferential post-child-labor-tax-case authority, 
the distinction between a tax and a penalty has not 
disappeared.123 
Besides - to rehun to my main point - Con-
gress was not engaging in any subterfuge with the 
individual mandate penalty. Congress did not call it 
a tax or rely on the taxing clause as authority for 
enactment. Nothing was hidden- quite the con-
trary- and the result, beginning in 2014, will be "a 
heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed and 
specified course of conduct."124 In discussing the 
appropriate level of deference to Congress, we 
should not make the analysis more difficult than it 
122United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
123 AI though I am in the rninori ty on this, I happen to think 
that the Child Labor Tax Case involved such a clear nontax 
penalty that it would be decided the same way today (if the 
issue could come up and assuming the commerce clause had 
remained static). In any event, despite the later authority on the 
tax-versus-regulation issue, the case is still on the books. And 
the Supreme Court has mandated that lower courts follow 
Court precedent, even if its continuing vitality has been chal-
lenged. It is up to the Supreme Court, that is, to discard its own 
precedents. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) 
(reaffirming "that '[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow 
the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions"' (alteration in 
original) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). 
124Because of the cap on the penalty - tying the maximum 
amount to the national average cost of bronze-level coverage, 
see supra text accompanying note 43- tl1e penalty is intended 
to be no greater burden than buying insurance. In that respect, 
if the appropriate comparison is between a comp]jant and a 
noncomp]jant taxpayer after enactment of the mandate, no 
heavy exaction is involved. But if the appropriate comparison is 
between the financial position of the noncompliant taxpayer 
before enactment of the individual mandate and her position 
after enactment, a heavy exaction is clearly involved. 
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needs to be: What Congress has called a penalty 
should generally be treated as a penalty and evalu-
ated accordingly. 125 
III. Direct Taxes and Taxes on Income 
I am convinced that the "penalty" for failure to 
acquire minimum essential coverage will be just 
that- a penalty and not a tax. If so, the appropriate 
constitutional analysis must be done tmder the 
commerce clause, to determine whether that clause 
gives Congress the power to require acquiring 
health insurance and to impose penalties on those 
who fail to satisfy the requirement. No more input 
on the taxing clause should be necessary. We should 
let taxing clause experts return to the beach to work 
on their bronze coverage. 
But if the administration and commentators in-
sist on calling the penalty a tax, on the assumption 
that the taxing clause might bolster the case for 
constitutionality, we must take the characterization 
issue seriously. If the penalty will be a tax, what 
does the Constitution have to say about its validity? 
The bottom line is that a tax must meet one of the 
alternative requirements set out in the Constitution 
- the uniformity rule if the tax is indirect, or the 
apportionment rule if it is direct - and that is true 
even if the commerce clause might provide inde-
pendent authority for enactrnent.l26 
A. Indirect vs. Direct Taxes 
The Constitution effectively divides the universe 
of permissible taxes into two broad categories. 
Duties, imposts, and excises are what are generally 
known as indirect taxes, although that is not a 
constitutional term, and they are subject to the 
uniformity rule, basically requiring that the levy be 
imposed in the same way across the country.127 For 
an in.direct tax, the rates and tax base must be the 
same in Montana as they are in Florida.128 Direct 
taxes, all other taxes,129 are subject to an onerous 
rule requiring that the aggregate liability for any 
direct tax be apportioned among the states on the 
125I use the \veasel-word "generally" only because one can 
imagine a situation in which Congress calls something a penalty 
in an attempt to avoid limitations on the taxing power. 
126In Part IV, I argue that even if the commerce clause can 
provide authority for enactment of the penalty, it cannot pro-
vide authority for ignoring the limitations that come into play if 
the ?.enalty is in fact a tax. 
L 7See U.S. Canst. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1 ("all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States"). 
128See Jensen, The Taxing Power, ch. 5 (2005). 
129Commentators have occasionally suggested that a re-
sidual category of levies might exist, one subject to neither the 
uniformity nor the apportionment requirement, see Jensen, 
supra note 23, at 2341 (citing Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, section 948, at 420-421 (1833)), 
but no such levy has ever been discovered. 
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basis of population 130 (unless the tax is on incomes 
and is therefore exempted from apportionment by 
the 16th Amendment131 ). For example, a state with 
one-tenth of the national population must bear, in 
the aggregate, one-tenth of the total liability for any 
direct tax, regardless of how the tax base is distrib-
uted across the cotmtry. The citizens and residents 
of a state with one-twentieth of the population must 
pay one-twentieth of the total. And so on. The 
uniformity and apportionment rules are alterna-
tives; one or the other applies to any particular 
levy.132 
If the penalty under the individual mandate will 
be an indirect tax, it will probably be constitu-
tional.133 Although some commentators have fow1d 
geographical variation in how the penalty will 
work, and thus a potential violation of the uni-
formity clause,134 I think the cap on the penalty will 
take care of the uniformity problem: The cost of 
insw·ance might vary across the nation, but the cap 
will be determined using a national average. 135 
Whether the penalty for any particular person will 
be the flat dollar amotmt, the percentage-of-income 
figure, or the bronze-level cap will not depend on_ 
geographical factors in a way that would implicate 
the tmiformity clause.136 (If I am wrong about that, 
however, the uniformity rule must be revisited.) 
130See U.S. Canst. Art. I, section 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and 
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers"); U.S. Canst. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4 ("No 
Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Propor-
tion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken"). 
131 U.S. Canst. Amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power 
to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration"). 
132And they are effectively mutually exclusive. Unless each 
state has the same percentage of the national tax base and the 
national population - almost impossible to imagine - an 
apportioned tax would not be uniform, and a uniform tax 
would not satisfy the apportionment rule. See Jensen, supra note 
23, at 2341-2342. 
1331 reemphasize that the "it" here is the penalty. I see no way 
that the taxing clause can provide authority for the individual 
mandate as a whole. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. 
134The Cato Institute and other amici have argued that 
because "the individual mandate penalty can depend in part on 
the cost of health insurance offered in the particular market," 
and "that cost will depend in part on rating areas within each 
state," Cato Brief, supra note 20, at 19, "the individual mandate 
penalty can vary by location and ... would be unconstitutional" 
if it were an excise. Id. at 19-20. 
135See also Kleinbard, supra note 49, at 760 (agreeing that 
urliforrnity is not a problem as part of his argument that the 
mandate as a whole presents no insuperable constitutional 
problems). 
136Jncomes do vary across the country, and the percentage-
of-income figure will therefore be higher, on the average, in 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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A charge that is an indirect tax and that satisfies 
the uniformity rule could conceivably meet the 
requirements of both the commerce clause and the 
taxing clause. As I argued il"l Part II, I do not think 
the penalty will be a tax to begin with, but if the 
penalty will be an indirect tax, that will not hurt the 
case for constitutionality. Indeed, to the extent that 
the taxing clause provides authority that goes be-
yond the commerce clause, the taxing clause by 
itself might validate the individual mandate pen-
alty if the commerce clause falls short. That works, 
however, only if the penalty will be an indirect tax. 
But if the penalty is deemed to be a direct tax and 
not a tax on incomes, it would have to be appor-
tioned to be constitutional. And the penalty could 
not work as desired if that is the case. The aggregate 
liability borne by the taxpayers of any state would 
have to be determined on the basis of population 
rather than by the percentage of the population that 
has failed to acquire health insurance. Consider two 
states with identical populations. If the penalty will 
be a direct tax, the total revenue from the penalty 
must be identical for the two states, even if, say, the 
first has twice as many uninsured as the second. 
That would be a bizarre result.137 If Congress were 
forced to rethink the penalty structure to meet 
apportionment requirements, it is hard to imagine 
that it could come up with a set of penalties that 
would both work technically and be politically 
palatable. 
B. Is the Penalty a Direct Tax? 
Apportionment of the penalty would lead to 
bizarre results, but if the penalty will be a direct tax, 
apportionment is what will be required to meet 
constitutional requirements. (As a practical matter, 
the apportionment rule should prevent enactment 
high-income states than in low-income ones. But the income tax 
need not take into account cost of living dliferences. In fact, it is 
generally assumed that building geographical cost of living 
dliferences into the income tax would violate the uniformity 
clause (which has been held to apply to the income tax even if, 
after the 16th Amendment, it remains a direct tax, see Brushaber 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1916)), although there is no 
authority precisely on point. 
137lf an income tax had to be apportioned - no longer the 
case after the 16th Amendment- apportionment would pre-
sumably require different tax rates in dliferent states. The total 
income tax revenue from two states with the same population 
would have to be the same, even if the average income is twice 
as high in state 1 than in state 2. That would presumably mean 
that the rates applicable in the richer state would have to be only 
half those in the poorer one. It is hard to imagine that Congress 
would ever have been willing to enact such a tax. See Erik M. 
Jensen, "Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the 
Direct-Tax Clauses)," 21 Canst. Comment. 355, 358-360, 369-374 
(2004). 
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of "penalties" that are really direct taxes.138) In this 
section I argue that the individual mandate penalty 
might be a direct tax, and with the stakes so high, 
this is an issue that must be taken seriously. 
Commentators rightly emphasize how limited 
the Supreme Court's conception of direct taxes has 
been; that is one reason Congress pays no attention 
these days to the possibility of apportionment.139 I 
suspect you would get blank stares from almost all 
members of Congress if you were to mention the 
direct tax apportionrnent rule.140 
The Founders unquestionably thought of capita-
tion taxes (specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
tion)141 and taxes on real estate as directl42; several 
federal real estate taxes were apportioned between 
1798 and 1861.113 In the minds of many, however, 
capitation and real estate taxes were it. Dicta in the 
great 1796 case of Hylton v. United States, 144 in which 
the Supreme Court concluded that a federal tax on 
carriages was not a direct tax, suggested that no 
other taxes can be direct. 145 Until the Supreme 
138l11at is the fundamental purpose of the apportionment 
rule: to deter Congress from enacting direct taxes, particularly 
those with decidedly sectional effects, except when revenue 
needs become overwhelming, as in a time of war. ld. at 373-374. 
In the healthcare context, Prof. Calvin H. Johnson adheres to his 
longtime position that the apportionment rule appHes only to 
easily apportioned taxes- that is, it applies only to those levies 
for which the rule is no limitation whatsoever. See Jolmson, 
"Healthcare Penalty Need Not Be Apportioned Among the 
States," Tax Notes, July 19, 2010, p. 335, Doc 2010-15557, or 2010 
TNT 137-7. l will go to my grave resisting the argument that a 
limitation on congressional power should apply only when it 
makes no difference. No document, certainly no constitution, 
should be interpreted in that way. 
139See, e.g., Con Law Brief, supra note 9, at 17-24. 
1400f course, you would get blank stares on many other 
constitutional issues as well. Anyway, Congress has not appor-
tioned a tax since 1861 and, to my knowledge, there has been no 
serious consideration of apportioning a lax for well over a 
century. Once the 1894 income tax was struck down in Pollock v. 
Fanners' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 
(1895), on the grounds that it was an unapportioned direct tax, 
there was no possibility of its being replaced by an apportioned 
income tax. An apportioned tax would not have worked as the 
income tax was intended to -hitting the relatively well-to-do 
Northeast the hardest- and there would have been no political 
support for such a tax. The 16th Amendment made possible the 
modem income tax, which does have sectional effects, by 
eliminating apportionment for any "tax on incomes." 
141 U.S. Canst. Art. l, section 9, d. 4. 
142See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175, 
177, 183 (1796). 
143See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45; Act of Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24; 
Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60;Act of)an. 9, 1815, ch. 21; Act of Aug. 
2, 1813, ch. 37; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75. 
1443 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
145/d. at 175 (Chase, J.) (stating that the direct taxes ..,contem-
plated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or 
poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other 
circumstance; and a tax on LAND"); id. at 183 (Iredell, J.) ("In 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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Court struck down the 1894 income tax a centmy 
later on the grmmd that it was a direct tax (at least 
insofar as it reached income from property) that had 
not been properly apportioned,l46 the direct tax 
apportionment rule was largely a dead letter. 147 
And the 16th Amendment, ratified in 1913, made 
it unnecessary to apportion a tax on incomes.14S 
With the cash cow that is the unapportioned income 
tax clearly constitutional, there was even less reason 
to reconsider the meaning of direct tax. In the 
recent, widely noted case of Murphy v. IRS,149 a 
panel of the District of Columbia Circuit canvassed 
Supreme Court case law, concluding that the cat-
egory of direct taxes is pretty much limited to 
capitations and taxes on property (with a tax on 
personal property now being treated the same as a 
tax on real estate).1so 
1. Direct taxes generally. Given the Supreme 
Court's narrow conception of direct taxes, one 
might think there is nothing left to say about the 
meaning of direct taxes and the possible application 
of the apportionment rule to the individual man-
date penalty. But I have two responses to the 
argument that direct taxes are nothing but capita-
tion taxes and property taxes and that the appor-
regard to other reports, there may possibly be considerable 
doubt"); id. at 177 (Paterson, J.) ("I never entertained a doubt, 
that the principal, [ will not say, the only, objects, that the 
framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within the 
rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land"). 
146 Pollock v. Farl/lers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 
U.S. 601 (1895). 
147[t did have some effect. As noted, Congress apportioned 
several national real estate taxes between 1798 and 1861. See 
supra text accompanying note 143. And one never knows what 
levies might not have seen the light of day because of congres-
sional concern that apportionment would have been required. 
1
"
18U.S. Const. Amend. XVI (exempting "taxes on incomes" 
from apportionment). 
149 Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-15916, 
2006 TNT 163-6 (Murphy I), vacated, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 22, 2006), Doc 2006-25647, 2006 TNT 248-3, decision on 
rehearing, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), Doc 2007-15777, 2007 
TNT 129-4 (Murphy II), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008); see 
Jensen, "Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, the Meaning of 
'Income,' and Sky-Is-Falling Tax Commentary," 60 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 753 (2010). 
150Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 181-186. Murphy considered 
whether a recovery for a nonphysical personal injury could 
constitutionally be included in the income tax base. The first 
time around, a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded that the 
recovery was not income and therefore could not constitution-
ally be reached by the income tax. On rehearing, in Murphy II, 
the panel concluded that the tax was in effect an excise, not a 
direct tax, which was valid whether or not the recovery was 
income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. [d. at 185. 
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tionment rule should therefore be automatically 
inapplicable to the penalty. 1st 
First, whatever the Supreme Court thinks, that 
cramped tmderstanding of direct taxes is wrong as 
a matter of first principle. It is absurd to think that 
the Fotmders meant to restrain only forms of taxa-
tion with which they were familiar. (What sort of 
constitutional limitation would that be?) I have 
elsewhere discussed at length an tmderstanding of 
the meaning of direct tax that is consistent with 
origin.al tmderstanding and that recognizes that 
forms of taxation tmknown to the Fotmders ought 
to be treated as direct if they share characteristics 
with capitation and real estate taxes. 152 
In a nutshell, the argument is this: Indirect taxes 
were w1.derstood to be taxes on reports of consump-
tion, and with indirect taxes, people can generally 
avoid liability by not buying the taxed goods. As a 
result, the national government cannot abuse indi-
rect taxes as long as the taxes are tmiform. If 
Congress raises indirect taxes too much, consump-
tion will decline and so will tax revenues - to the 
government's detriment. In contrast, direct taxes 
generally cannot be shifted to someone else and 
therefore cannot be easily avoided. In that respect, a 
capitation tax, which is imposed directly on per-
sons, is the quintessential direct tax.153 Because 
direct taxes were more dangerous - they could be 
abused by an overreaching government in a way 
indirect taxes could not- they needed to be subject 
to a more stringent constitutional limitation. 
After it heard arguments in Murphy for the 
second time, the D.C. Circuit panel seemed to be 
sympathetic to this understanding as a theoretical 
matter15'1 - it really is strange to think the only 
direct taxes can be those known in 1789- but the 
panel concluded, correctly, that the Supreme Court 
has not interpreted the direct tax clauses in that 
way. 155 Following Supreme Comt hints, 156 the Mur-
phy court was reluctant to extend the universe of 
151 [ need to keep repeating- sorry! -that [ think appor-
tionment will be unnecessary, because I do not think the penalty 
will be a tax at all. But if it will be a tax, apportionment issues 
become serious ones. 
152See Jensen, supra note 23, at 2389-2402. 
1530f course, any tax is avoidable in some ways. A capitation 
tax, for example, can be avoided by committing suicide or by 
removing oneself from the jurisdiction of the taxing entity. But 
neither of those steps is easy. Direct taxes were tmderstood to be 
relatively unavoidable compared with indirect taxes. 
IS4Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 183-184. 
Iss rd. 
156[ say "hints" because the Supreme Court has not outlined 
a theory to distinguish direct from indirect taxes. Once a body of 
unprincipled case law developed that characterized just about 
any tax as indirect, it was hard to find a principle that would 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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direct taxes beyond the examples known to and 
accepted by the Founders, plus the income tax for 
which apportionment is no longer required any-
way.Is7 
All that is fair enough- wrong, as a matter of 
original understanding and good sense, I think, but 
consistent with reality. It is unlikely that the Su-
preme Court will reinvigorate the direct tax clauses 
today by finding a particular tax to be direct under 
this chain of abstract reasoning unless . ... I now 
turn to that unless, the other reason characterization 
of the individual mandate penalty is not easy. 
2. Capitation taxes in particular. The concept of 
direct tax has been narrowly understood, but every-
one has to accept that a capitation tax is direct.15B 
The Constitution specifically refers to "Capitation, 
or other direct, Tax" in connection with apportion-
ment.159 In categorizing the individual mandate 
penalty for purposes of constitutional analysis, we 
ignore the meaning of capitation or capitation tax at 
our peril. 
To the extent the man on the street thinks about 
capitation taxes,160 I suspect he assumes they are 
lump sum taxes imposed on everyone subject to the 
national taxing jurisdiction. Indeed, a CRS report-
prepared by sophisticated folks - said, without 
citation of authority, that "a capitation, or head tax, 
is a fixed tax imposed on each person in a jurisdic-
tion."161 Balkin wrote in 2009 that those taxes are 
'"head' taxes on the general population, tmder 
which people are taxed no matter what they do."162 
The amicus brief filed by several constitutional law 
scholars in the Virginia litigation, including Balkin, 
baldly stated that "capitation taxes ... are imposed 
on a per-person basis without regard to property, 
lead to a different result in a new case. See Jensen, supra note 149, 
at 843-846 (describing the D.C. Circuit's perusal of Supreme 
Court case law in Murphy II). 
157Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 183-184. 
158 At least I think that is so, although there are still folks 
willing to argue that constitutional provisions ought to be 
ignored when they get in the way. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 
138; cf. Bruce Ackerman, "Taxation and the Constitution," 99 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 58 (1999) (arguing that because of constitutional 
moments - and the fact that the apportionment rule would 
interfere with his proposal for a national wealth tax - the 
original understanding that real estate taxes are direct should no 
longer be given effect). But even Johnson and Ackerman con-
cede that a capitation tax is direct. 
159U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4; see Ackerman, supra note 
158, at 58 (arguing that only capitation taxes should be treated 
as direct today). 
160And why would anyone do that, given that enactment of 
a straightforward national capitation tax has, as far as I am 
aware, never been seriously considered? 
161 Starnan I, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
162Balkin, supra note 21, at 482. 
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income or other circumstances,"163 the latter phrase 
largely picked up from Justice Samuel Chase's 1796 
opinion in Hylton v. United States.164 And, citing the 
work of Prof. Joseph Dodge, Prof. Edward D. Klein-
bard characterized a capitation tax as "imposed on 
a person simply by virtue of his existence."16S 
In fact, Kleinbard wrote that a "capitation tax is 
universally understood as a tax imposed on an 
individual 'without regard to property, profession 
or any other circumstances,"'166 directly quoting 
Chase.167 And Kleinbard supplied what he thinks 
are the relevant circumstances that should keep the 
individual mandate penalty from being treated as a 
capitation. The penalty "applies only to applicable 
individuals with income above specified thresholds 
who choose to self-insure their healthcare costs; in 
turn, the amount of the tax varies with incomes. 
These are special circumstances that take section 
5000A(b) out of any common tmderstanding of a 
capitation tax."16B 
If Kleinbard's statement reflects the "universal 
tmderstanding," I must come from another uni-
verse. I do not dispute his description of the "com-
mon understanding," but I am unconvinced that it 
holds up to scrutiny and therefore should be uni-
versal. To begin with, if capitation is limited to lump 
sum taxes - something that is implicit in the idea 
that the tax cannot depend on "other circum-
stances" - the apportionment requirement seems 
to be superfluous. Why did the Founders bother to 
require apportionment based on population for a 
tax that by its nature seems automatically to be 
apportioned? (If the tax is, say, $2,000 per person, a 
state's percentage of the national population will 
automatically equal its percentage of the national 
tax liability.) In fact, apportionment of a lump sum 
capitation tax would have mattered in 1789, and 
might still matter today for reasons I note in the 
163Con Law Brief, supra note 9, at 3; at 25 ("As Story 
explained in his Commentaries ... , capitation taxes, or, as they 
are more commonly called, poll taxes [are] taxes upon the polls, 
heads, or persons, of the contributors") (quoting Story, supra 
note 129, section 112, at 424). 
164Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J.). 
165Kleinbard, supra note 49, at 761 (citing Joseph M. Dodge, 
"What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment 
Under the Constitution?" 11 U. Pa. J. Canst. L. 839, 841-843 
(2009)). 
166Id. at 762 (emphasis added). 
167 A capitation tax is thus the quintessential direct tax: It is 
unavoidable and cannot be shifted to anyone else. 
168Kleinbard, supra note 49, at 761 ("It applies only to 
taxpayers with incomes above specified levels, and then only to 
those taxpayers who have made the economic decision to 
self-insure their healthcare costs"). 
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margin, 169 but it is nevertheless the case that appor-
tionment is a much less serious constraint for a 
lump sum head tax than for other taxes. What, one 
might ask, was the point of emphasizing capitation 
taxes in the Constitution if the term was Lmderstood 
to encompass so little? 
My second point: Is it really the case that Con-
gress can avoid apportionment by fiddling with the 
terms of a tax to make it less than generally 
applicable? It would be peculiar to see a tax im-
posed on everyone subject to U.S. taxing jurisdic-
tion as requiring apportionment, but an otherwise 
similar tax that reached much but not all the 
population - if Congress exempts a person here 
and there in a way that satisfies the rule of geo-
graphical uniformity - as falling outside the ap-
portionment rule. If exempting a few persons 
makes a levy something other than a capitation, and 
if we accept the idea that direct taxes are only 
capitations so understood and property taxes, we 
really would come close to gutting the apportion-
ment rule. In other contexts we would not accept 
interpretive principles that eviscerate the provision 
being interpreted.l7° Why should we do so here? 
Regarding the individual mandate penalty in 
particular, it has been said that some "might point 
to the fact that the tax would not be imposed on 
individuals with insufficient income as evidence 
that it should not be characterized as a capita-
tion."171 Some might do that, but surely the 
Fmmders understood that impoverished American 
citizens or residents would be unable to pay a 
capitation tax (or any other tax, for that matter) in 
169Given that slaves were counted as only three-fifths of a 
person, and Indians "not taxed" (i.e., those Indians who had not 
become naturalized citizens) were not counted at all, U.S. Const. 
Art. [, section 2, cl. 3, apportionment computations were not as 
straightforward as might otherwise have been the case. More 
generally, there was a concern- and there would certainly be 
a concern today- about who gets counted in the computations. 
Preswnably it is the same people who get cot.inted for purposes 
of apportioning representatives, and, as we know, who should 
be counted for that purpose (illegal aliens?) remains a conten-
tious question. See Jensen, supra note 23, at 2391-2392. 
1700ccasionally text must be disregarded because one pas-
sage contradicts another. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (finding it impossible to reconcile two 
contradictory phrases in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); see 
also Jensen, "Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country," 
60 Me. L. Rev. 1, 30-41 (2008) (discussing Chickasaw Nation). That 
situation is not the norm, however, and in other circwnstances 
we must try as best we can to make sense of constitutional, 
statutory, and regulatory language. Cf Kawaau/zau v. Geiger, 523 
U.S. 57, 62 (1998) ("We are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of 
a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another 
portion of that same law"). But cf Johnson, supra note 138 
(arguing for interpretation of the direct-tax clauses in a way that 
gives them little effect). 
171Staman I, supra note 4, at 7. 
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whatever form it might take. At the foLmding, a 
capitation tax would therefore have had to be 
subject to exceptions, either in the governing statute 
or in enforcement practice, and that remains true 
today. 172 If the apportionment rule is going to have 
any force at all, the term "capitation" carmot be 
restricted to levies that reach everyone.173 
Point number three: I am also Lmconvinced that it 
is or should be "universally" Lmderstood that the 
amount of capitation tax liability cannot depend on 
"circumstances" beyond a taxpayer's existence. Can 
Congress avoid having a tax treated as a capitation 
by having liability vary from person to person ever 
so slightly according to "other circumstances"? 
Once again, that would make it much too easy for 
Congress to circumvent the apportionment require-
ment. (That many would like that to be the case 
does not make it so.) 
Let us test the persuasiveness of the "other 
circumstances" argument. Suppose Congress en-
acted a taxing regime Lmder which all citizens and 
resident aliens with annual incomes exceeding 
$50,000 were required to pay a tax of $1,000, but the 
liability for those with incomes of $50,000 or less 
172Cf. Galle, supra note 83, at 28 ("Congress may condition 
exemptions from a tax on any criteria it chooses - other than 
those expressly prohibited by the Constitution, such as restric-
tions on free speech- so long as it is willing to pay the political 
price for carving out that exception"). 
173We know for sure that the FOLmders did not expect 
everyone to have to bear tax liability with a capitation tax 
because slaves, counted as three-fifths of a person for this 
purpose, were certainly not expected to satisfy any capitation 
liability themselves. And a person who would have been liable 
for any capitation that fell on slaves - the slave owner -
would have had an aggregate liability different from someone 
who owned no slaves, or, for that matter, from another slave 
owner who owned a different number of slaves. 
[hesitated to make this point about counting slaves because 
it has been argued that the direct tax apportionment rule should 
be narrowly construed, and perhaps ignored altogether, since it 
was part of an invidious compromise with slavery. See Acker-
man, supra note 158, at 58 (arguing that the "original under-
standing must be revised in light of the Civil War .... Given the 
Reconstruction Amendments, there is no longer a constitutional 
point in enforcing a lapsed bargain with the slave power"). 
There was a slavery connection, to be sure, but, as I have argued 
elsewhere," the apportiorunent rule, which applies to represen-
tation as well as direct taxation, wasn't pro-slavery." Jensen, 
supra note 137, at 375. On one hand, counting a slave as 
three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation repre-
sented a positive for the slave states. (Many northerners had 
argued that slaves should not be counted at all for that purpose.) 
But the slave states would have been delighted not to count 
slaves at all when it came to determining a state's share of 
national direct tax liability. Read together, the apportiorunent 
rules for representation and direct taxation were neither pro-
nor anti-slavery - hardly a positive, I admit, but not an 
unqualified evil, either. See Jensen, supra note 23, at 375; see also 
Jensen, "Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the 
Direct-Tax Clauses," 15 f.L & Pol. 689, 702-706 (1999). 
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would be $2,000.174 (Let us assume for purposes of 
this hypothetical that we can agree on a conception 
of "incomes" that is consistent with the meaning in 
the 16th Amendment.) I take it that the "universal" 
understanding is that this would not be a capitation 
tax because, even though it reaches everyone, the 
amount of the levy would depend on other circum-
stances - in this case, income levels. Couple that 
conclusion with the general academic and judicial 
understanding that the apportionment rule applies 
only to capitation taxes (we just concluded this 
would not be one) and taxes on property (which 
this tax clearly would not be). Voila! We have an 
indirect tax that, because it would be uniform in its 
application (the same rules in all states), would be 
constitutional. 
That is crazy. Of course this would be a direct tax! 
This hypothetical tax would not be avoidable or 
shiftable in any easy way.175 And I also think that 
with everyone obligated to pay it, this is a capita-
tion tax, as universal understanding should have it. 
(Application to everyone should not be necessary 
for a tax to be a capitation, as I argued above, but it 
makes a levy look a lot more like what people 
"·universally" think of as a capitation.) This is a tax 
on existence, on being, but with the measure of the 
tax varying from person to person. Unless this 
would be a tax on incomes - I will address that 
question in the next section of the reportl 76 - it 
would have to be apportioned to be valid. 
I concede that my hypothetical tax is preposter-
ous. If it were enacted - impossible to imagine! -
it would result in higher revenues from poorer 
states than from richer ones, unless the apportion-
ment rule would come into play. With apportion-
ment, however, the sectional effects of the tax 
would be eliminated. The liability per person, on 
average, from a poor and a rich state would be the 
same; it would have to be the same. It is because the 
tax would have to be apportioned to be constitu-
tional (assuming it is not a tax on incomes) that the 
average amount collected from each taxpayer 
would be identical. A capitation tax becomes a lump 
174Yes, this is a law professor's hypothetical, dealing with 
something that could not possibly happen in the real world. But 
for what it is worth, if a law professor had hypothesized the 
individual mandate 25 or so years ago, he would have been 
viewed as out of Ius mind. 
175lf this were an indirect tax, it would satisfy the urriforrnity 
rule - the tax would apply in the same way in all states, even 
though the effects would vary from state to state- but it is not 
like the indirect taxes contemplated by the Founders. 
176 A preview: There are reasons to question whether a tax 
that reaches !Ugh-income taxpayers more gently than low-
income ones is a tax on incomes. 
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sum tax (on the average) because of apportionment, 
not because the term "capitation tax" encompasses 
such a requirement.l77 
Relatively little direct evidence exists that the 
Fm.mders thought a capitation tax can vary in its 
effects from person to person, but there are hints.J7S 
And we know that a contemporary of the Founders, 
Adam Smith, thought that could be the case.179 The 
Constitution does not necessarily embody th.e prin-
ciples of The Wealth of Nations, of course, but some 
of the Founders were familiar with Smith's writ-
ings.l80 Following Smith, I have argued that a tax on 
incomes was understood by some in the late 18th 
century as the quintessential capitation tax (one of 
the reasons the Supreme Court came to a defensible 
result in 1895 when it invalidated an 1.mapportioned 
income tax).181 Smith criticized capitation taxes that 
are "proportioned to the forttme or revenue of each 
contributor" or are proportioned to the "rank of 
each contributor,"182 but those taxes had been im-
posed in the past - and they had been understood 
to be capitation taxes.1s3 
My point is not that the Founders automatically 
would have thought of an income tax, say, as direct. 
It is only that it is not bizarre to think the Founders 
understood the term "capitation tax" as having 
much broader scope than Kleinbard's "universal" 
conception. They would have 1.mderstood that the 
apportionment rule was supposed to make the 
imposition of those taxes 1.mlikely. If that tax were to 
be seriously considered, however, it was under-
stood that apportionment would temper its un-
happy, sectional effects by making the tax into 
something like a lump sum head tax. 
Does any of this matter in the real world, par-
ticularly in how we think about the individual 
mandate penalty? Maybe not. The constitutional 
law professors' brief in the Virginia litigation stated 
that "the Supreme Court has never struck down a 
1771 keep saying "on the average" because the apportionment 
rule does not say how much any particular taxpayer has to pay; 
it ~eal<s only to the aggregate to be collected from each state. 
78See supra note 173 (discussing slavery and capitation 
taxes). 
179See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 818-821 (Edward 
Cannan ed., Random House Inc. 1937) (1776). 
180In his opirrion in Hylton, decided in 1796, Justice Paterson 
quoted two lengthy passages from The Wealth of Nations. See 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180 (quoting Smith, supra note 179, at 
821) ("The state not knowing how to tax directly and propor-
tionably the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it 
indirectly, by taxing their expence, wruch it is supposed in most 
cases will be nearly in proportion to their revenue"). 
181 See Jensen, supra note 23, at 2392-2393. 
182Srnith, supra note 179, at 819. 
183Id. at 819-821. 
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federal tax on the ground that it is a capitation,"184 
and that is true enough. But it is not as though this 
issue has regularly been before the Court. I am not 
aware of any tax the constitutionality of which has 
been seriously questioned and that might have been 
characterized as a capitation tax185 - tmtil now.lB6 
But, I hear you say, the individual mandate 
penalty is different from my hypothetical tax. I 
agree that it is different, but I am not so sure it is 
fundamentally different. Let me tie up some loose 
ends. 
With the individual mandate penalty, say the con 
law professors, the penalty: 
is based on a very specific circumstance: the 
taxpayer's failure to pay premiums into a 
qualified health care plan in a given month. 
Taxpayers can easily remove themselves from 
the tax by purchasing health insurance; this 
ability to exit the tax is not true of poll taxes or 
any other capitation tax.187 
The con law professors would argue, I am sure, that 
easy avoidance would distinguish the penalty from 
my hypothetical tax, one that by its terms cannot be 
avoided. 
Well. What seems easy for well-paid law profes-
sors at Yale and Columbia might not seem quite so 
easy for large segments of the American population. 
The quintessential indirect tax, as tmderstood by 
the Founders, was one that could be avoided by not 
purchasing the taxed good and by substituting an 
untaxed good or doing without. In contrast, the 
individual mandate "tax," if that is what it will be, 
will apply if the taxpayer does nothing, and she has 
184Con Law Brief, supra note 9, at 25. To be precise, a tax 
would be struck down not because it is a capitation, but because 
it is an tmapportioned capitation. An apportioned capitation is 
constitutional. The con law profs got the language right else-
where. See id. at 23 ("The Court has 11ever invalidated a tax on 
the Ws"ound that it is an unapportioned capitation tax"). 
1 5I suppose that given what I have written about Smith and 
capitation taxes, the Pollock decisions in 1895 are exceptions to 
my statement in the text. However, the ultimate decision in 
Pollock, that the 1894 income tax was an unapportioned direct 
tax, did not focus on the tax as a possible capitation. That should 
not be surprising. If an unapportioned tax is direct, it is invalid 
whether or not it is a capitation, which is just one form of direct 
tax. 
186It is not unheard of for the Supreme Court to invalidate 
provisions that have been around for a long time. See, e.g., INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (irwalidating dozens of statutory 
provisions involving unicameral vetoes); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (holding dual 
for-cause limitations on removal of members of PCAOB uncon-
stitutional). 
187Con Law Brief, supra note 9, at 25 (emphasis added); cf 
Balkin, supra note 21, at 482 (stating that a "good analogy would 
be a tax on polluters who fail to install pollution-control 
equipment; they can pay the tax or install the equipment"). 
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no way to avoid a significant obligation one way or 
the other. The individual mandate, the combination 
of the requirement to acquire insurance and the 
penalty if that is not done, really will approach a 
universal set of obligations, just like my hypotheti-
cal tax. (Some people will be exempted, as would 
have to be true with my hypothetical tax as well, 
but that group is intended to be relatively small.) 
Yes, it is expected that most of the population, 
although subject to substantial obligations under 
the individual mandate, will not be paying any-
thing to the federal government, and I argued 
earlier that the taxing clause cannot provide author-
ity for the mandate itself.l88 But I do not think I am 
being hypocritical in looking at the mandate and 
the penalty as a package for purposes of this 
analysis. I am taking seriously the argument being 
advanced by some proponents of the mandate: If 
the mandate will really be part of a scheme that 
derives its constitutional authority from the taxing 
clause, it makes sense to look at all the obligations 
created by that scheme. Congress has effectively 
said, "Pay a tax (if the penalty will be a tax) or pay 
something else." That set of unavoidable obliga-
tions is based on existence, on being. 
Also, or maybe this is another way of making the 
same point, if the penalty is going to be character-
ized as a tax to begin with- and that is the theory 
that would justify invoking the taxing clause- we 
should be viewing the "tax" as the central part of 
the enterprise. The "tax" will fall on everyone, with 
exceptions to be sure, unless some other, costly steps 
are taken. As one commentator argued, a "tax on a 
person who chooses not to act is precariously close 
to a tax on everyone with an exemption from the tax 
for those who act."189 One thing can be said without 
doubt: If the penalty really will be a tax, it will be 
unlike any indirect tax previously known. 
In sum, if we take as the starting point that the 
individual mandate scheme will involve a tax, the 
argument that Congress has enacted an tmappor-
tioned capitation tax is not frivolous. I do not think 
we should be heading down the tax path at all, as I 
have said over and over,190 but if we begin on that 
path, we need to follow it to its logical end. These 
188See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. 
189George M. Clarke III, "Baucus 'Excise' on Those Who Fail 
to Buy Insurance Raises Constitutional Issues," OTR, Sept. 29, 
2009. We know that not everyone will be subject to the penalty, 
but the estimates of how much revenue will be brought in by the 
penalty are at best informed guesses. See supra note 48. And we 
can be reasonably sure, can we not, that more persons will be 
subject to the penalty in 2014 and 2015, when the floor and 
percentage-of-income figures will be relatively small, than will 
be the case in 2016 and thereafter, when the mandate will be 
full(sJ:hased in. 
9 And over. 
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arguments are serious enough that no one should 
be relying on an incomplete, albeit "universal," 
understanding of capitation taxes to rebut them. 
C. Tax on Incomes? 
Whether the Supreme Court was right or not in 
concluding that the unapportioned 1894 income tax 
was invalid, with the 1913 ratification of the 16th 
Amendment a tax on incomes no longer had to be 
apportioned. Thus, even if the individual mandate 
penalty will be a capitation or other form of direct 
tax, it will not have to be apportioned if it will be a 
tax on incomes.l91 Let me remind the reader that I 
do not think the penalty will be a direct tax, because 
I do not think it will be a tax at all. But if it will be 
a tax, which I now accept for the sake of argument, 
it might very well be direct. And if so, its categori-
zation as a tax on incomes could be critical. 
It has been argued that the penalty will be a tax 
on incomes. For example, Kleinbard has made the 
following points: 
On its face, section 5000A(b) ftmctions as an 
income tax. It is a section of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Low-income taxpayers are ex-
empt ... the amotmt collected is measured as 
a percentage of income ... (subject to a floor 
and a ceiling), and the amount is includable on 
a taxpayer's federal income tax return. So why 
isn't it an income tax, and as such plainly 
constihltional?192 
Sebelius made basically the same points in a memo-
randum, dated September 3, 2010, in support of 
summary judgment in the Virginia litigation.193 
Maybe the penalty will be an income tax, but if 
so, it will not be for those reasons. Being in the code 
does not turn a penalty into a tax, nor does it make 
a tax an income tax. (If placement matters at all, the 
penalty is in the part of the code devoted to excises, 
not the income tax.l94) I do not understand that 
191 An apportioned income tax would be a horror and almost 
certainly could never have been enacted. See supra note 137. 
192](]einbard, supra note 49, at 760. 
193
"Congress repeatedly treated the minimum coverage pro-
vision as a tax. It is in the Internal Revenue Code. Its penalty 
acts as an addition to an individual's income tax liability on his 
annual return, which is calculated by reference to income. It is 
enforced by the Internal Revenue Service. And it will raise a 
projected $4 billion annually for general revenues. The provi-
sion thus falls easily within Congress's independent authority to 
lay taxes and make expenditures for the general welfare." 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Jud~ent, supra note 78, at 2-3. 
4fo be sure, if the penalty will really be an excise, an 
indirect tax, it almost certainly will be constitutional anyway. See 
supra text accompanying notes 133-136. But see supra note 77 
(questioning whether placement in the code should be given 
interpretive weight and noting that the D.C. Circuit in Murphy 
concluded that an excise could be hidden in the income tax 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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exempting low-income taxpayers makes the pen-
alty, or any other charge that is unquestionably a 
tax, into an income tax. (I will return to this point in 
a moment.) And the reference to the income tax 
return is silly. The fact that I satisfy my Ohio use tax 
liability by including it on my Ohio income tax 
rehlrn, as I do, does not convert the use tax into an 
income tax.195 Would a tax that is universally under-
stood to be a capitation tax ($100 per person, say) 
become an income tax if Form 1040 included a line 
for its inclusion? Of course not.196 
Kleinbard's reference to the "floor and ceiling" in 
the individual mandate penalty did not belong in a 
parenthetical. The floor and ceiling will mean that 
for many persons the measure of the penalty will 
not be in.come. Income is used as one of the alter-
native components to determine the amount of the 
penalty - the greater of a fixed figure and a 
percentage of something that is dependent on in-
come, capped by the cost of bronze-level coverage 
- but it is a bit much to say that this will be a tax 
on income. Although tlu·ee different figures must be 
computed and compared, the income figure will 
turn out to be irrelevant for many persons subject to 
the penalty.197 
provisions of the code); Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 187 
(noting placement of the penalty with excise tax provisions and 
stating that "if this is supposed to be an income tax, it certainly 
is well hidden from the view of an experienced tax profes· 
sional"). 
195The use tax does not become an income tax, for example, 
for purposes of section 164, dealing with the deductibility of 
state and local taxes in computing federal taxable income. 
196Whether or not Adam Smith's view that an income tax 
was a capitation tax helps us understand constitutional mean-
ing; see supra text accompanying notes 178-183 (a capitation tax 
need not be an income tax). 
197Will a tax (if the penalty will be a tax to begin with) be 011 
incomes if it may be measured by income for some persons but 
not be for many others? What would the constitutional author-
ity be for imposing an unapportioned direct "tax" on some 
particular person if for her the amount of the liability is not 
dependent on her income? 
Galle has told me that I seem to be arguing that the 
Constitution requires a particular bracket structure to count as 
an income tax, and no court ever would or should impose that 
requirement. If a purported income tax resulted in exactly the 
same liability for those with income between $50,000 and 
$100,000, he argues, it should still be an income tax, even for 
those with incomes between those two figures. One of course 
hopes that Congress would never impose that tax, but if it did, 
I think the problem goes beyond "bracket structure." Note that 
the $50,000 of income between those two extremes would not be 
reached at all by this hypothetical tax. In what sense is imposing 
a tax of, say, $10,000 on someone with income of $50,000 and 
exactly the same amount, $10,000, on someone with an income 
of $100,000 a tax on incomes? We are used to the term "income 
tax," but for this purpose, I want to emphasize the actual 
constitutional language, "tax on incomes," complete with prepo-
sition. If income goes up, tax liability should too. If that does not 
happen, at least in general we do not have a tax on incomes as 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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I want to return to another of Kleinbard's points 
in support of treating the penalty as a tax on 
incomes - that "low-income taxpayers are ex-
empt."19B The argument seems to be that a tax with 
a hardship exception defined in terms of income is 
a tax on incomes. Galle has made that point explic-
itly, noting that "the obligation to pay the minimum 
$695 tax [in 2016] is subject to exemptions for 
personal hardship, which are also determined with 
reference to income."199 But that argument goes too 
far; it would have the effect of potentially making 
any tax with a hardship exemption - which is to 
say almost any tax- into a tax on incomes. That is 
like the claim, made to me many years ago, that all 
taxes are income taxes because they will be satisfied 
from income. That might be a plausible economic 
argument, but it has no legal force. 200 There is no 
reason to think the 16th Amendment was intended 
to do away with the direct tax clauses altogether,Z01 
and by its terms, the amendment deals only with 
taxes 011 incomes, not taxes in which a calculation of 
income plays some role, however attenuated. 
Willis and Chung add, and I agree, that the 
penalty calculation will not involve the sorts of 
issues that we would expect with a tax on income: 
"The provision refers to no gains, receipts, accruals, 
or accessions to wealth, other than to an arguably 
unimportant algebraic function of income for some 
taxpayers."202 Kleinbard's response is unconvinc-
ing: "Imposing mandatory government collections 
calculated as a percentage of household income, 
while perhaps an w<important algebraic ftmction, is 
exactly how an income tax operates."203 That is how 
an income tax operates, but it is not how the 
individual mandate penalty will operate. Galle has 
similarly argued that the penalty will be an income 
tax in part "because whether a family pays $695 [in 
2016] or some other amount depends on the house-
hold income."204 But the Willis-Chtmg argument 
was not that "income" will be ignored in the 
calculations; it is that, regardless of whatever calcu-
lations are done along the way, the amount of the 
understood by the proponents of the 16th Amendment. See infra 
text accompanying notes 206-207. 
198Kleinbard, supra note 49, at 760. 
199Galle, supra note 83, at 31. 
200See Jensen, supra note 23, at 2413. 
201 In fact, there is reason to think that was not the intention. 
See Jensen, "The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and 
the Meaning of 'Incomes,"' 33 Ariz. St. L.f. 1057, 1114-1123 (2001) 
(discussing how Congress did not adopt a resolution that, had it 
been ratified by the states, would have repealed the direct tax 
clauses altogether and instead intentionally limited the category 
of taxes not subject to apportionment to "taxes on incomes"). 
202Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 187. 
203Kleinbard, supra note 49, at 760. 
204Galle, supra note 83, at 31. 
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penalty for many persons will ultimately not de-
pend, in anything like a direct way, on household 
income. "Mandatory government collections" will 
not be "calculated as a percentage of household 
income" for anyone subject to the floor or the cap.zos 
Return to the levy I hypothesized in the preced-
ing section - a $1,000 tax that would reach all 
persons with incomes exceeding $50,000, with a 
levy of $2,000 on those with incomes of $50,000 or 
less. (As before, let us assume that we can come up 
with a definition of income that would coincide 
with the term "incomes" in the 16th Amendment.) 
As with the calculation of the individual mandate 
penalty, determining the amount of liability does 
require calculating "income" - in this case,· of all 
persons - but I can conceive of no argument that 
this tax would be imposed 011 income. 
Indeed, my hypothetical tax, if it were treated as 
on "incomes," would htrn the traditional justifica-
tion for an income tax on its head. We should 
remember what the proponents of the 16th Amend-
ment were trying to do: to make sure that well-
to-do Americans would pay their fair share of 
national taxes, something that had not happened 
with a revenue system heavily dependent on tariffs 
and other taxes on consumption.206 The 1894 in-
come tax, which the Supreme Court struck down in 
1895, reached a very small percentage of the Ameri-
can population - about 1 percent, all well-to-do. 
Similarly, the income taxes imposed after ratifica-
tion of the 16th Amendment in 1913 and before 
American entry into World War I reached only the 
wealthy. Tax liability was unquestionably tied to 
income: the higher the income, the higher the tax 
liability. 207 
205Prof. Ljubomir Nacev has raised an interesting theoretical 
argument: We might consider medical care provided at little or 
no cost to Lminsured persons as income to those persons. ([ 
doubt that the benefit would be treated as part of gross income 
under section 61, but it would not strain the concept of income 
to do so.) To the extent that a penalty is imposed on that 
uninsured person, we might treat that penalty, if it were a tax, as 
a tax on that care-related income. At best, however, although 
this helps with the conceptual issue, the issue remains. For 
many uninsured persons, there will be no income component in 
any particular year. For example, the self-insured wealthy will 
not be receiving subsidized care, and the seemingly immortal 
self-insured young are also unlikely to be receiving that care. In 
those cases, there is no additional "income" to tax, but the "tax" 
will be imposed anyway. More generally, even for those who do 
receive subsidized care, the penalty will not be measured by the 
value of that care. To my mind, it will not be imposed on 
incomes. 
206See Jensen, supra note 201, at 1091-1107. 
207[ am not talking progressivity here. A proportional tax, 
with the same rate on all income, would also result in higher tax 
obligations for higher-income people. (For that matter, a regres-
sive income tax, with lower marginal rates on higher levels of 
income, would still bring in more revenue from high-income 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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Rather than imposing higher taxes on the rela-
tively well-to-do, my hypothetical tax would hit 
lower-income persons harder. That tax, which I 
think would unquestionably be direct, should not 
be protected from apportionment by the 16th 
Amendment. And the same is true with the indi-
vidual mandate penalty. Uninsured persons with 
incomes of $500,000, $1 million, $10 million, $100 
million, and $1 billion will have to pay exactly the 
same penalty- the cost of bronze-level coverage. If 
that is a tax on incomes, I will eat my insurance 
card. 
A similar point can be made about Social Security 
taxes, to be sure, and that makes me nervous. The 
Supreme Court has never said that self-
employment taxes and the portion of Social Secu-
rity taxes that is in form paid by employees are 
taxes on incomes, but that has generally been 
assumed to be the case.208 Unlike the archetypical 
income tax, however, the Old Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance tax has been subject to an 
ammal income cap,2°9 has been tmquestionably 
regressive, and has represented by far the largest 
federal tax obligation for low-income Americans. A 
tax that disproportionately hits lower-income per-
sons is not what proponents and ratifiers of the 16th 
Amendment had in mind when taxes on incomes 
were exempted from apportionment. 
I would not expect any court to invalidate the 
Social Security system, regressive although many of 
its tax effects might be, and I am not arguing for that 
to happen.210 (I do wish a bit more thought had 
been given back in the day to the constitutional 
basis for Social Security taxation, but we carmot 
turn back the clock.211 ) Willis and Chung provide a 
taxpayers than from low-income taxpayers, as long as the 
marginal rate on the highest income does not reach zero.) What 
I am saying is thai a lax lhat does not require higher absolute 
obligations on higher-income persons than on lower-income 
ones would 'not be a "tax on incomes," focusing on the consti-
tutional language, and it would be inconsistent with the goals of 
the 16th Amendment. 
208Willis and Chung note that the basic Social Security and 
self-employment taxes, capped as they are, have the effect of a 
flat amount tax for many. Nevertheless, it is assumed that they 
are valid taxes on incomes. Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 
187. Or, in the alternative, it has been assumed that these levies 
are not direct taxes to begin with. Cf Lawrence Zelenak, 
"Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious 
Legislator," 99 Coh11n. L Rev. 833, 843 n.58 (1999) (describing 
unsuccessful constitutional challenges to Social Security taxes). 
209The Medicare component of the Social Security tax scheme 
has not been subject to an income cap for some time. 
210That can of worms would be slimy beyond belief. 
211 It may well be that in 1935 it was assumed that the 
creation of a social insurance scheme for which "premiums" 
had to be paid did not involve taxes at alL See Erik M. Jensen," A 
Tax or Not a Tax, That Is the Question," 14 Green Bag 2d 368 
(2011). 
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way to distinguish the OASDI tax from the indi-
vidual mandate penalty, and for present purposes, 
their argument seems good enough to me: With the 
individual mandate penalty, many uninsured will 
pay the flat minimum or maximum amount, neither 
of which is determined by income, while, despite 
the cap, by far most persons subject to the OASDI 
tax pay the percentage-of-earnings rate.212 That is 
an arguably important difference, but the constitu-
tional status of OASDI taxes still makes me uncom-
fortable.213 
IV. The Commerce Clause and the Taxing Power 
One final issue, which has been implicit in the 
discussion to this point, is worth making explicit: If 
the commerce clause provides sufficient support for 
the individual mandate, is there any reason to care 
whether the penalty might be a tax or not? In a 2009 
report in Tax Notes, Dean (and constitutional 
scholar) Erwin Chemerinsky was quoted as saying 
that the proposed excise (as it was then called) "is 
so clearly within. Congress's commerce power that 
it is not necessary to consider whether it fits within 
the taxing power."214 For Chemerinsky, it did not 
seem to matter whether the charge would be a tax at 
all, or, if it would be a tax, whether it would be 
direct or indirect. Chemerinsky's position seems to 
be taken for granted by many other proponents of 
the individual mandate.215 
Chemerinsky's conclusion that Congress has the 
power under the commerce clause to impose the 
penalty may be correct - because of ignorance, I 
am agnostic on that point - but the idea that the 
commerce clause trumps specific limitations on the 
taxing power cannot be right. All sorts of taxes 
affect commerce and perhaps would be authorized 
under the commerce clause, especially as broadly 
interpreted as it has come to be, even if there were 
no taxing clause in the Constitution. But the com-
merce clause can provide no authority for circum-
venting the specific limitations on the taxing power 
that apply to charges that are in fact taxes - the 
uniformity rule or the apportionment rule, as ap-
propriate. If the commerce clause could be used to 
212Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 188. 
213It would also make me uncomfortable, however, if I had to 
rely on an implicit understanding of Social Security taxation to 
argue in support of the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate penalty. I find less than compelling an argument that 
takes the form, "We take for granted that this old system is OK, 
so this new one must be too." 
214Clark, supra note 11, at 736. 
215Not all, to be sure. For example, the brief of the constitu-
tional law professors in the Virginia litigation recognizes that if 
the penalty will be a tax- and they argue that will be the case 
- it wiJI have to be an indirect tax to satisfy constitutional 
requirements. See Con Law Brief, supra note 9, at 17-26. 
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trump constitutional limitations on the taxing 
power, those limitations would be meaningless, or 
nearly so,216 and we should not interpret constitu-
tional terms in such a way. 
If the individual mandate penalty will be a tax 
but an indirect one, there should be no constitu-
tional problem, as I argued earlier. It should satisfy 
the uniformity rule,217 and if the penalty is also 
deemed a regulation of commerce, so much the 
better.218 The taxing clause can come to the rescue if 
the commerce clause cannot do the job by itsel£.219 
If the penalty will be a direct tax, however, and 
assuming it will not be a "tax on incomes" pro-
tected by the 16th Amendment - in Part III, I 
suggested those are serious possibilities - it would 
have to be apportioned among the states on the 
basis of population. That has not been done,22° and 
it could not be done if the penalty is to work as 
intended. Regardless of congressional power under 
the commerce clause, a direct tax that is not on 
incomes must be apportioned to be valid.221 
Of course, if the penalty will not be a tax, 
constihttional limitations on the taxing power 
would be irrelevant - analysis is so much easier if 
the charge is not a tax - and we could then look 
only to the commerce clause for legitimacy. But 
with a tax, those complications come into play. That 
216Cf Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 180 ("If Congress 
can lay an unapportioned direct fee on people who fail to do 
what it wants them to do, the fourth sentence of Article 1, 
section 9 means nothing. Any direct tax can merely be relabeled 
a fee"). 
217But if Chemerinsky was suggesting that the commerce 
clause would give Congress the power to enact an excise that 
would not satisfy the uniformity clause- a levy that varies in 
apelication from state to state - he was wrong. 
218 A tariff, for example, might be viewed as an exercise of 
both the commerce and taxing powers, and the limitations that 
apply to taxes would present no problem. A tariff (a "duty" or 
"impost") would have to be uniform in its application, see supra 
note 20, but as long as it applies in the same way in all states, 
uniformity exists. 
219! remain unconvinced, however, that the taxing clause can 
validate the individual mandate as a whole. See supra text 
accompanying notes 45-49. 
22
°Cf Willis and Chung, supra note 11, at 170 ("Even if the act 
survives a commerce clause challenge, it still fails a capitation 
challenge"). 
221 It was universally understood at the founding that a tax 
on real estate was direct, early Congresses apportioned those 
taxes, see supra note 143, and the Supreme Court has never 
suggested that apportionment might no longer be necessary for 
those taxes. The 16th Amendment, exempting only "taxes on 
incomes" from the apportionment requirement, did nothing to 
change that longtime understanding. I assume Chemerinsky 
did not mean to suggest that Congress would have the power 
today, under the commerce clause, to circumvent the apportion-
ment rule for a direct tax on real estate. Or did he? Cf. 
Ackerman, supra note 158, at 58 (arguing that taxes on wealth 
should no longer be treated as direct taxes). 
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a tax should be analyzed as a tax is a mundane 
point, I suppose, but too many m1.mdane points get 
lost these days in the rush to constitutional judg-
ment. 
V. Conclusion 
Analyzing something as complex as the indi-
vidual mandate inevitably involves thorny issues, 
but this report has argued that the invocation of the 
taxing clause as an alternative, constihttional justi-
fication for the mandate has made the analysis 
thornier than it needs to be. My argument, point by 
point, has been this: First, the taxing clause provides 
no authority for requiring the acquisition of insur-
ance. Second, the penalty for failure to acquire 
minimum essential coverage should not be treated 
as a tax at all and, whatever proponents of the 
individual mandate think, that mal<es the case for 
constitutionality easier. Third, if the penalty will be 
a tax, it might be a direct tax (in particular, a 
capitation tax), and if so, it will be invalid because it 
will not be apportioned and it will not be a tax on 
incomes. Finally, even if the individual mandate can 
be justified 1.mder the commerce clause, the consti-
tutional rules dealing with taxes will come into play 
-if the penalty will be a tax. 
One final point is worth making. Although the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to strike down signifi-
cant parts of a monumental piece of legislation on 
constitutional gro1.mds, the probability of that hap-
pening is not zero, especially if the merits can be 
reached before the legislation would come into 
effect. (With the individual mandate, Congress 
would have time to adjust before 2014.) And sup-
porters of the individual mandate have increased 
the likelihood of judicial problems by raising theo-
ries under the taxing clause that are more problem-
atic than helpful. 
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